The Constitution of Law 2006
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511618246.002
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Legality in a time of emergency

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Cited by 11 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…One contribution in this collection does focus on the Nazi-related example on which the debate is based; David Dyzenhaus' revisitation of the case of the grudge informer [12]. Dyzenhaus has written extensively on the nature of wicked law and emergency situations [see 10,11,13], but this piece, too, best serves to illustrate how remote Nazi law actually was from the Hart-Fuller debate. The grudge informer cases, of which the case discussed by Hart and Fuller is one example, took place in the post-Nazi context and were about Germans who informed on their partner to the Nazi authorities for violating draconian legal provisions, in order to get rid of them, 1 rather than about the nature of Nazi law itself.…”
Section: Representing Nazi Law In the Nyulr Symposiummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One contribution in this collection does focus on the Nazi-related example on which the debate is based; David Dyzenhaus' revisitation of the case of the grudge informer [12]. Dyzenhaus has written extensively on the nature of wicked law and emergency situations [see 10,11,13], but this piece, too, best serves to illustrate how remote Nazi law actually was from the Hart-Fuller debate. The grudge informer cases, of which the case discussed by Hart and Fuller is one example, took place in the post-Nazi context and were about Germans who informed on their partner to the Nazi authorities for violating draconian legal provisions, in order to get rid of them, 1 rather than about the nature of Nazi law itself.…”
Section: Representing Nazi Law In the Nyulr Symposiummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is, the reelection probability is higher if the executive is more successful in preventing a terrorist attack, a result that has received empirical support. 14 We use a simple probabilistic voting rule for the representative citizen because our primary focus is to assess the security rationale for executive discretion, which presumes that increased electoral incentives to prevent a terrorist attack induce the executive to choose optimal security policies. In the Appendix, we provide a micro-foundation for our reelection rule in a framework in which the policy outcome provides information about an unknown level of executive's competence to prevent terrorist attacks and in which the representative citizen is prospectively rational in the sense that her goal is to maximize future utility.…”
Section: Re-election Decisionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…De notre point de vue, le contrôle de l'immigration au Canada peut être adéquatement décrit comme un état d'exception continu et toujours sous l'autorité de la loi, comme une sorte de zone grise (Dyzenhaus, 2006 ;Vermeule, 2009) dans laquelle les contraintes qui pèsent sur l'action ministérielle sont si faibles qu'elles permettent au gouvernement d'agir non seulement comme bon lui semble, mais souvent aussi avec l'approbation d'un tribunal. Nous mettrons plus spécifi quement l'accent sur la composante judiciaire du contrôle de l'immigration 7 , en montrant comment les événements sont traduits et connaissent une mise en forme pénale spécifi que à la Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié (CISR), mais aussi comment ce type de punition se distingue des formes classiques de châtiments qu'on retrouve dans le droit pénal.…”
Section: Et Le Ministère De La Sécurité Publique Et De La Protection unclassified