Legal Disagreements and Theories of Reference

Abstract

According to Hartian positivists, law is a conventional practice that requires a convergence that includes not only the regularity of behavior but also of certain beliefs and attitudes. It is easy to conclude that in this framework the meaning of terms is determined by shared criteria that are transparent to all parties, a form of semantic descriptivism. This, at least, is the way in which Dworkin and his followers have interpreted Hart's positivist stance. The problem is that disagreements often arise on how to interpret the words of the law, and this fact seems to conflict with the emphasis of positivism on the idea of agreement, or so it is argued. If the meaning of legal terms depends on shared criteria, why do individuals disagree? And if they disagree, what does their disagreement consist in? 2 We use the word "conventional" in a more flexible way than Lewis (1969) and the authors that discuss him. Regarding the conventional nature of law, see (Marmor 2009) and (Vilajosana 2010). 3 There is an important difference, often missed, between interpretive disagreements, disagreements about the concept of law and disagreements about the sources of the law, among others. Here we will analyze only interpretive disagreements, that is, disagreements about the content of the law. 4 Descriptivism finds its inspiration in the semantic theories of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Russell (1910-1911 and other works) explicitly defended that referential terms such as proper names are abbreviations of definite descriptions. Frege's commitment to descriptivism is debatable. According to Frege (1892) what determines the reference of expressions is a sense, conceptual

On whales and fish. Two models of interpretation

“…Which of those considerations should be taken into account in different cases is the next important issue to address. As we have argued (Martí -Ramírez-Ludeña 2016), different theories of law have different conceptions of the nature of the relevant considerations, and the dispute between Dworkinians and Hartians can be seen from this perspective as a dispute over this issue. For a Hartian the considerations have a conventional character and for a Dworkinian they always depend ultimately on moral factors.…”

La interpretació literal dels textos constitucionals

“…És a dir, la versió que proposo preserva les intencions de manera rellevant: qui introdueix la normativa ha de tenir la intenció de referirse al mateix fenomen, però el punt central és que això no comporta que les seves descripcions o les de la comunitat determinin la referència. En tot cas, així presentada, aquesta nova concepció sembla compromesa amb el fet que, un cop s'ha consolidat una cadena de comunicació, el significat queda fixat d'una vegada i 22 Emfatitzant aquests punts, vegeu Martí i Ramírez-Ludeña (2016).…”

La creación de precedentes interpretativos

“…Pero el descubrimiento de la naturaleza del agua ocurrió mucho después de que se usara el término. Y esto, a su vez, puede generar dudas e ideas erróneas sobre la similitud relevante(Martí y Ramírez-Ludeña, 2016). En el ámbito jurídico, esto es precisamente lo que ocurre con términos como «violencia», en que no parece que sean descripciones transparentes las que determinan los usos correctos del término y explican a qué referimos con él.…”