Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation

Izquierdo, Luis R.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Vega‐Redondo, Fernando

doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007

Cited by 49 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In the theoretical literature on partner choice, relatively little attention has been given to these questions. First of all, a large proportion of models consider cooperation as an all-or-nothing decision and thus cannot study its quantitative level [4,5,25,37,39,40,48,53,62,89,94,108]. Second, some models consider cooperation as a quantitative trait but do not entail diminishing returns, and are thus ill-suited to study the social efficiency of cooperative interactions [51,74,88,92].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cooperation is not running away

Geoffroy

Baumard

André

2018

Preprint

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confidence: 99%

Why cooperation is not running away

Geoffroy

Baumard

André

2018

Preprint

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“…Three partner control mechanisms ( positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching) have all been shown to be able to stabilize cooperation in panmictic populations in separate models [3,20,27]. However, few studies have investigated under which conditions selection would favour one partner control mechanism over another.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Still another partner control mechanism is partner switching [16][17][18][19][20]. By partner switching an individual can avoid being exploited by a defector by simply stopping the interaction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions

2016

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Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals then need to use a conditional strategy to deter their interaction partners from defecting. Responding to defection such that the future payoff of a defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called a partner control mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i) to switch from cooperation to defection when being defected ('positive reciprocity'), (ii) to actively reduce the payoff of a defecting partner ('punishment'), or (iii) to stop interacting and switch partner ('partner switching'). However, such mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often studied in isolation from each other. In order to better understand the conditions under which each partner control mechanism tends to be favoured by selection, we here analyse by way of individual-based simulations the coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching. We show that random interactions in an unstructured population and a high number of rounds increase the likelihood that selection favours partner switching. In contrast, interactions localized in small groups (without genetic structure) increase the likelihood that selection favours punishment and/or positive reciprocity. This study thus highlights the importance of comparing different control mechanisms for cooperation under different conditions.

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“…Genetically not so different L (cheater)-type ants seem to move from one colony to another to exploit S (normal)-type ants. Izquierdo et al (2010Izquierdo et al ( , 2013 and references therein show simulation results which we can interpret as co-existence of cooperators and defectors (although in a restricted set of strategies).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%