Learning from history: Low-cost project innovation in the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Recurring Challenges as Main Constraints to AU/NEPAD Projects

“…The World Bank, for example, has successfully executed projects in infrastructure and mining industries, among others, in Africa (Ika, 2012). Similarly, project failure in organizations, including the World Bank, is not uncommon (Hermano, Lopez-Paredes, Martin-Cruz, & Pajares, 2013;Ika;Jin & Hovav, 2013;McCurdy, 2013), especially projects involving complex technology (Smith, 2002) that entail knowledge-intensive work and diverse expertise to execute (Pee, Kankanhalli, & Kim, 2010), coupled with high uncertainty about funding issues. Over US$5 billion has been invested by the World Bank in over 700 projects in Africa during the past 20 years (Ika).…”

Learning styles: A detailed literature review

“…The study additionally discusses the areas for enhancements. Curdy (2013) [26] investigated the low-priced project innovation within the physics and house administration. This study provides a history of The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)'s expertise with lowpriced innovation.…”

Ambidexterity as Historically Embedded Process: Evidence From NASA, 1958 to 2016

“…The precipitating event triggering higher degrees of cooperation among the dispersed units was the shared desire "to go to the moon, plus the competition and the deadline that was imposed by the knowledge that the Russians were trying to do the same … When project Apollo came along in 1961, it transformed the requirements that were placed on these research laboratories" (McCurdy, 2013). President Kennedy's September 1962 speech instilling to the nation the vision of going to the moon and returning safely before the decade was out, was a super-ordinate goal that precipitated a period of intense focus and collaboration at NASA, what Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) refer to as a revolutionary change.…”

“…The Climate Orbiter cost $326.6 million to develop and simply disappeared behind Mars (NASA, 2013). It would be fair to say that the FBC approach left a mixed legacy within NASA (Lambright, 2007; McCurdy, 2013), and despite its best intentions, it was not successful in accomplishing ambidexterity.…”

“…Hence, there is a temporal incongruence between NASA's program development and US Congress funding mechanisms. McCurdy argues that this "encourages bureaucrats to spend money they do not need or waste time waiting for appropriations they have not received"(McCurdy, 2001: 96) and may lead to "maintaining people on the payroll without giving them the money to build something"(McCurdy, 2013). The annual budget-driven approach often results in NASA having to stretch project schedules to accommodate the changes and the re-planning that increases fixed and indirect costs(National Research Council, 2012).…”