Dawn Brancati and Adrián Lucardi offer a bold challenge to the conventional wisdom in democratization research, which since Samuel Huntington's seminal analysis of The Third Wave (1991) has highlighted diffusion processes as important contributors to (attempts at) political regime change. By contrast to a wealth of research that has demonstrated contagion and demonstration effects (Beissinger 2007; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Torfason and Ingram 2010; Wejnert 2014), the authors provocatively argue that democracy protests-contention guided primarily by the quest for democratization-do not significantly spread among neighboring countries. A battery of statistical investigations that tests for a broad set of model specifications finds weak and highly inconsistent results, casting serious doubts on diffusion arguments. With their spirited criticism, Brancati and Lucardi usefully point to several problems in diffusion research. Almost by definition, this literature tends to have a skewed focus on instances in which diffusion occurs; nondiffusion, by contrast, tends to be off the agenda. Moreover, these writings tend to highlight contagion and demonstration effects but pay less attention to deterrent effects, which can be equally if not more powerful-and forestall a wave of replication efforts. By pointing to these issues, Brancati and Lucardi sound an important note of caution and remind scholars not to overestimate the power and significance of diffusion impulses. But the authors "throw out the baby with the bathwater" by suggesting that democracy protests do not diffuse at all. Here, however, the validity, significance, and theoretical relevance of the quantitative results seem questionable. Are the statistical methods employed by Brancati and Lucardi well suited for the analysis