Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game

Gamba, Astrid

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009

Cited by 16 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The check consecution starts with checking the inequalities (27), where two games are solved towards (15) and (20). Then goes subconsecution of checking the inequalities (22), (29) and (30) 1, nN  , needing three games to be solved, towards (15), (20) (15) and (20). When the weakly consistent solution (15) of the game (12) is checked for consistency, there are used solutions (15) and (33) once again, and then N inequalities (31) are checked first, whereupon come those N inequalities (32).…”

Section: Discussion and Conclusive Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, NE-solutions render a lot of the refined or modified principles of optimality, allowing to smooth differences in utility and equity [2], [10], [11]. Mainly, they are principles of Pareto equilibrium [2], [6], [8], [10], [13], [14], Mertens-stable equilibrium [15], trembling hand perfect equilibrium [16], proper equilibrium [17], [18], correlated equilibrium [19], sequential equilibrium [20], [21], quasi-perfect equilibrium [18], [22], [23], perfect Bayesian equilibrium [18], [20], [24], [25], quantal response equilibrium [26], [27], self-confirming equilibrium [28], [29], strong Nash equilibrium [30], [31], Markov perfect equilibrium [32], [33]. The question is only to find NEsolutions as fast as possible.…”

Section: Noncooperative Game Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Romanuke

2015

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering

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-The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling uniformly the players' payoff functions with the constant step along each of the hypercube dimensions. The author states the conditions for a sufficiently accurate sampling and suggests the method of reshaping the multidimensional matrix of the player's payoff values, being the former player's payoff function before its sampling, into a matrix with minimally possible number of dimensions, where also maintenance of one-to-one indexing has been provided. Requirements for finite NE-strategy from NE (Nash equilibrium) solution of the finite game as the initial infinite game approximation are given as definitions of the approximate solution consistency. The approximate solution consistency ensures its relative independence upon the sampling step within its minimal neighborhood or the minimally decreased sampling step. The ultimate reshaping of multidimensional matrices of players' payoff values to the minimal number of dimensions, being equal to the number of players, stimulates shortened computations.

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Section: Discussion and Conclusive Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Noncooperative Game Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Romanuke

2015

Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering

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“…Gamba [135] takes an indirect evolutionary approach to studying altruism in the centipede game, but considers self-confirming equilibria (Fudenberg and Levine [131]) instead of Nash equilibria. There are two types of player, selfish types and altruists.…”

Section: Self-confirming Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Newton

2018

Games

173

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Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

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“…3 Gamba (2013) is an interesting exception. She assumes play of a self-con…rming equilibrium, rather than a Nash equilibrium, in an extensive form game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

Heller

Mohlin

2014

SSRN Journal

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We develop a framework in which individuals'preferences co-evolve with their abilities to deceive others regarding their preferences and intentions. We show that a pure outcome is stable, essentially if and only if it is an e¢ cient Nash equilibrium.All individuals have the same deception ability in such a stable state. In contrast, there are non-pure outcomes in which non-Nash outcomes are played, and di¤erent deception abilities co-exist. We extend our model to study preferences that depend also on the opponent's type.

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Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game

Cited by 16 publications

References 11 publications

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Uniform Sampling of the Infinite Noncooperative Game on Unit Hypercube and Reshaping Ultimately Multidimensional Matrices of Player’s Payoff Values

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Coevolution of Deception and Preferences: Darwin and Nash Meet Machiavelli

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