Law environment, government regulation and implicit contract: Empirical evidence from the scandals of China’s listed companies

Chen, Donghua; Tie-sheng, Zhang; Li, Xiang

doi:10.1007/s11459-008-0028-2

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the public interest theory, regulation comes from investors'objective demand for correcting market failure (Peltzman, 1976;Stigler, 1971). The government regulation could be a substitute for the law to protect investors' interests when the legal system is not perfect enough (Chen, Zhang, & Li, 2008;Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001;Peltzman, 1976;Stigler, 1971). To protect the interests of the investors, the CSRC has committed to maintain the healthy operation of the capital market and to correct market failure by establishing the supervision mechanism of information disclosure.…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comment letters and internal control opinion shopping

Yao

Xue

2019

China Journal of Accounting Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Taking Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2017 as our samples, this paper investigates the supervision effect of comment letters on internal control opinion shopping at audit firm level, branch level and signing partner level respectively. The empirical results show that the pressure from comment letters can significantly decrease the probability of internal control opinion shopping at both audit firm level and signing partner level. This supervision effect is more pronounced when there are internal-control-related questions in comment letters or the firm's annual auditor is required to give opinions on some questions in comment letters. As for the branch level of audit firms, it is found that the supervision effect of comment letters on internal control opinion shopping is more pronounced in the firms which switch from headquarters to branches. We also find comment letters have spillover effects on firms in the same industry, in the same province or with the same auditors.

show abstract

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comment letters and internal control opinion shopping

Yao

Xue

2019

China Journal of Accounting Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A large body of research examines the relationship between formal institutions and economic activities (Chen, Zhang, & Li, 2008;La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997;Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Some scholars also study how economic activities are affected by informal institutions, such as religious beliefs and culture.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Management language experience, cultural integration and the performance of mergers and acquisitions

Xiao

et al. 2019

China Journal of Accounting Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Institutional economists believe that language, as an important informal institution, has a significant impact on economic activities. However, the study of language on corporate behavior is still relatively insufficient. Our paper examines the influence of linguistic distance between the acquirer and the target firm on M&A performance in China, from 2000 to 2012. The results indicate that the linguistic distance between the acquirer and the target firm significantly reduces the performance of M&As. Furthermore, we suggest that the influence of language differences on the performance of M&As is mainly driven by the cultural effect rather than the communication effect. In addition, we find that the relationship between language differences and M&A performance is affected not only by manager characteristics, types of mergers and corporate ownership structures, but also by regional development. This paper provides a new way to examine management's participation in M&A activities from the perspective of language.

show abstract

“…Reformed from a centrally planned economy, the Chinese government exerts substantial influence on firm values (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007;Cheung et al, 2010) and corporate activities through numerous channels, including appointing executives (Chen et al, 2006), allocating external financing (Chen, Zhang, and Li, 2008), influencing investment opportunities (Chen et al, 2013), or granting subsidies. We extend this line of research by examining whether corporate political connections affect the contagion effect of scandals in this section.…”

Section: Do Political Connections Matter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance, Political Connections, and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

Yu¹,

Zhang²,

Zheng

2015

Financial Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates intra‐industry spillover effects of corporate scandals in China. We demonstrate how a contagion effect spreads to peer firms depending upon the quality of corporate governance and their political connections. Good corporate governance in peer firms reduces the contagion effect of scandals. External governance has a stronger influence on reducing the contagion effect of both financial and non‐financial scandals, while ownership concentration and the quality of auditors play a more pronounced role in mitigating the contagion effect of financial scandals. State ownership helps to mitigate the negative influence of non‐financial scandals in individual‐owned firms, but not in state‐owned enterprises.

show abstract

Law environment, government regulation and implicit contract: Empirical evidence from the scandals of China’s listed companies

Abstract: law environment, government regulation, implicit contract, corporate scandal, K22, K23, 法律环境, 政府맜制, 隐性契约, 公司丑闻,

Cited by 13 publications

References 15 publications

Comment letters and internal control opinion shopping

Comment letters and internal control opinion shopping

Management language experience, cultural integration and the performance of mergers and acquisitions

Corporate Governance, Political Connections, and Intra‐Industry Effects: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About