Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Winters, Matthew S.; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca

doi:10.5129/001041513x13815259182857

Cited by 250 publications

(199 citation statements)

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“…an expenses scandal) to study the effects of bribery on voters' opinions and vote choice (Peters and Welch, 1980;Vivyan et al, 2012;Wagner et al, 2014). Moreover, many analyses use survey experiments (Anduiza et al, 2013;Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013;Eggers et al, 2014;Wagner et al, 2014) to provide insights on the causal mechanisms in decision-making processes. Yet, analyses based on a single national context do not allow us to study cross-national differences even though such differences are likely to exist (van der Brug et al, 2007;Duch and Stevenson, 2008).…”

Section: Data and Measurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Past research on the effects of corruption on incumbents' electoral performance is often based on macro-level data and addresses variation in corruption across countries (Ferraz and Finan, 2008;Krause and Mendez, 2009;Choi and Woo, 2010). Microlevel analyses, in turn, are often linked to specific scandals and certain national contexts (Peters and Welch, 1980;Welch and Hibbing, 1997;Vivyan et al, 2012;Basinger, 2013;Praino et al, 2013;Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013;Wagner et al, 2014). In this article, we employ the CSES data to analyse corruption performance voting and its constraints under various micro-and macro-level factors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following the arguments from the economic voting literature, corruption performance voting should be more likely in electoral contexts where government parties have unified control over policy-making. Higher clarity of responsibility should make it easier for citizens to identify corruption and scandals, and a high level of information about corrupt practices is linked to corruption performance voting (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). There are of course differences between the economy and corruption as performance voting issues.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

Ecker

Glinitzer

Meyer

2015

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Fighting corruption is a vital aspect of good governance. When assessing government performance voters should thus withdraw electoral support from government parties that turn a blind eye to or even engage in corrupt practices. Whereas most accounts of performance-based voting focus on economic outcomes, we analyse whether and to what extent voters punish incumbents for high levels of corruption. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we find that while voters perceiving high levels of corruption punish incumbents, corruption performance voting depends on individual-level attributes and the electoral context: it is most likely for non-partisans, for voters who believe that government turnover will bring about change, and in systems where corruption is a salient issue. Yet, corruption performance voting is not moderated by the clarity of political responsibility. Studying these conditions helps us to understand why corruption is more persistent in some contexts than in others.

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Section: Data and Measurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

Ecker

Glinitzer

Meyer

2015

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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“…This lack of transparency enables officials to act in their own interest and against the public will (Rose- Ackerman, 1978). In light of this challenge, scholarship has shown that informing the public-by, for example, making them aware of officials' corruption-can promote electoral accountability (Ferraz and Finan, 2008;Chang et al 2010;Banerjee et al 2011;Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2012;Larreguy et al, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

ynamic Transparency: An Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act

Lagunes¹,

Pocasangre²

2017

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.http://www.iadb.org 2017 Abstract * Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) aim to provide a channeled exchange between citizens and public officials that, irrespective of the citizen's identity, results in the provision of timely, relevant, and often new information about policy. The authors of this paper evaluated Mexico's FOIA by submitting 307 information requests on behalf of an average male citizen to government entities in the years , the authors also submitted the same requests to 87 comparable entities on behalf of a male citizen who signaled clout. For the most part, entities are not discriminating between regular and seemingly influential citizens. Entities are also answering more frequently and providing more information in 2015 compared to earlier years, but they are taking longer to answer, frequently charging fees, and often failing to provide quality information to questions they are legally bound to answer. Mexico's FOIA is a functional system demanding significant improvements. Practitioner Points• Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) aim to promote the equitable provision of timely, relevant, and often new information about government.• Given the prevalence of failed reforms in Latin America, the question is whether Mexico's FOIA has succeeded.• Over an extended time period (eight years), Mexico's FOIA has witnessed an increase in the likelihood that info...

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“…by evidence Finan 2008, 2011;Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013), reveals that voters punish corrupt incumbents whenever they have access to credible and reliable information about acts of corruption. Politicians, however, misbehave both when they engage in corruption and when they waste public resources because of their mismanagement or misuse (Bandiera et al 2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

Arvate

Mittlaender

2017

Public Choice

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This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates the extent to which voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for reductions in voters' welfare, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions of voters' choice calculus. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians: while corruption always is punished, self-interest alone-in the absence of norms-leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses.

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Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Cited by 250 publications

References 17 publications

Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

ynamic Transparency: An Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

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Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption: When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?

Cited by 250 publications

References 17 publications

Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

Corruption performance voting and the electoral context

ynamic Transparency: An Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act ﻿

Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior

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ynamic Transparency: An Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act