L'Allemagne, la Libye et l'Union européenne

Abstract

L’abstention allemande face à la résolution 1973 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies découle des fondamentaux mêmes de la politique étrangère du pays. L’UE a néanmoins démontré dans la crise libyenne sa capacité à adopter des politiques communes en matière de sanctions et dans le domaine humanitaire, avec engagement allemand. Le développement de la Politique de sécurité et de défense de l’UE ne peut se faire qu’autour de missions militaires de faible ou de moyenne intensité, et avec accord entre Paris et Berlin. politique étrangère

Assessing the influence of France and Germany on EU foreign and security policy

“…Case study 4: Military operation in Libya -Blocking dissensus Our fourth and last case is the only one where Franco-German cohesion is weak (Göler & Jopp 2011;Menon 2011;Calla & Demesmay 2011;Koutrakos 2013;Aggestam 2015). Domestic politics negatively affect this cohesion (Paterson 2011).…”

“…Most of these differences relate to the military. They concern, in particular, the German refusal to intervene militarily in Libya (Göler & Jopp 2011), peacekeeping in the Western Balkans (divergences in the early 1990swhen Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatiarapidly overcome in the mid-1990s; Miskimmon 2007, Charillon andWong 2011), and peacekeeping in Africa (Germany being more reluctant than France about being strongly involved). Regarding Africa (Blunden 2000, Calla & Demesmay 2013, France is still very active, in particular in its former colonies, and continues to participate in crisis management through military interventions.…”

“…Military intervention appears to be the main issue limiting this Franco-German inclination towards compromise. This has obliged France and the UK to intervene outside the EU framework in Libya (2011) (Göler & Jopp 2011) and may have contributed to a decrease in the number of CSDP military operations between 2008 and 2013. As far as this issue is concerned, Franco-German cohesion fluctuates and the prospect of finding a bilateral compromise that could benefit the EU as a whole seems very dependent on the context, as we will see in the next section.…”

“…The effectiveness of the partnership between the two countries would be rather limited (Stark 2012, Calla & Demesmay 2013, as well as their capacity to initiate concrete EU foreign and security action. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Germany abstained, together with China, Russia, India and Brazil, when the UNSC voted on a resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya in 2011 (Göler & Jopp 2011, Menon 2011. This decision made a European operation impossible, leading France and the United Kingdom to intervene in the framework of NATO.…”

Zwischen Handeln und Zaudern – die Europäische Union in der Libyen-Krise

“…61 Dass die politische Elite sich dieser Skepsis bewusst ist, zeigte sich unter anderem in der jahrelangen Vermeidung der Bezeichnung des Afghanistan-Einsatzes als "Krieg". 62 Außenminister Westerwelle verwies in seiner Regierungserklärung vom 18. März 2011 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag daher auch explizit auf die Lehren aus "jüngeren Militäreinsätzen" (Afghanistan und Irak) und den damit verbundenen zivilen Opfern.…”