Krym. Rossiya…Navsegda? Critical Junctures, Critical Antecedents, and the Paths Not Taken in the Making of Crimea’s Annexation

Abstract

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is widely framed as an outside-in process, not only enabled but also enacted by the Kremlin. Prevailing accounts privilege geopolitical analysis and place those developments in a broader narrative of tension and competition between the West and Russia. Such a narrative downplays the involvement of local actors and the importance of the choices they made prior to and during those events. This article revisits the period leading up to March 2014 through a focus on critical junctures, critical antecedents, a near miss, and the path not taken. It argues that a full account of Crimea’s incorporation into Russia – while acknowledging Moscow’s role – cannot ignore the local contingencies that preceded and shaped it. We understand the region’s annexation as a key moment of institutional change in Ukraine and focus our attention on explaining how that outcome was determined, identifying the path to such a political outcome. Yanukovych’s decision to “catapult” political-economic interest groups from Makeevka and Donetsk into the peninsula led to the marginalization of the local elite. Regime change in Kyiv and a slow and cumbersome response from the new authorities in February-March 2014 triggered, but did not cause, Crimea’s exit option.

Ethnonationalism or a Financial-Criminal Incentive Structure? Explaining Elite Support in Crimea for Russia’s Annexation

“…However, Russia's meandering route to recruiting Aksenov suggests he possessed more power than a 'puppet' (discussed below). Moreover, this narrow focus obscures the involvement of other actors within Crimea's Communist Party and PoR DeBenedictis (2021), Matsuzato (2016), andFumagalli andRymarenko (2022). Yet, those emphasizing the fallout between 'locals ' and 'Macedonians' within PoR, (DeBenedictis 2021;Matsuzato 2016;Fumagalli and Rymarenko 2022), overlook the role of organized crime and corruption in such fallout and realignment.…”

“…Meanwhile, Yanukovych continued to curb local gangster power in Crimea (while not curbing Donetsk-based gangsters) by installing PoR cadres from Donetsk (so-called 'Macedonians') in key power positions in Crimea. 11 He also bulldozed PoR opposition, including pro-Russian opposition ( (Lashchenko 2021;Fumagalli and Rymarenko 2022)). While Crimean (even PoR) MPs were angered by their subordination to 'Macedonians', only the smaller number of Yulia Tymoshenko Blok Crimean MPs resisted "the invasion of non-Crimean cadres" (Prytula 2010).…”