Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge

Carter, Adam; McKenna, Robin

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…It is worthwhile noting further that Carter and McKenna (), in their defense of Sosa, do not adduce any evidence in favor of the claim that we actually have apt meta‐beliefs about our first order beliefs—though, to be fair, the criticism I develop here is not one that they anticipated.…”

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confidence: 66%

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

Shieber

2019

Philosophical Issues

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Ernest Sosa has suggested that we distinguish between animal knowledge, on the one hand, and reflective knowledge, on the other. Animal knowledge is direct, immediate, and foundationally structured, while reflective knowledge involves a knower's higher-order awareness of her own mental states, and is structured by relations of coherence.Although Sosa's distinction is extremely appealing, it also faces serious problems. In particular, the sorts of processes that would be required for reflective knowledge, as Sosa understands it, are not processes that are instantiated in human cognition. Philosophical Issues. 2019;29:241-253.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/phis

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confidence: 66%

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

Shieber

2019

Philosophical Issues

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“…See, for example,Kornblith (2009Kornblith ( , 2010Kornblith ( , 2012 for some notable criticisms of Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction. Cf.,Perrine (2014) andCarter and McKenna (2018). 2 For a view of trustworthiness as a kind of disposition, seePotter (2002) andHardin (1996).…”

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confidence: 99%

On behalf of a bi-level account of trust

Carter

2019

Philos Stud

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A bi-level account of trust is developed and defended, one with relevance in ethics as well as epistemology. The proposed account of trust-on which trusting is modelled within a virtue-theoretic framework as a performance-type with an aim-distinguishes between two distinct levels of trust, apt and convictive, that take us beyond previous assessments of its nature, value, and relationship to risk assessment. While Sosa (A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, University Press, Princeton, 2017), in particular, has shown how a performance normativity model may be fruitfully applied to belief, my objective is to apply this kind of model in a novel and principled way to trust. I conclude by outlining some of the key advantages of the performance-theoretic bi-level account of trust defended over more traditional univocal proposals.

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“…For instance, one might have animal knowledge when one uses ones visualperceptual conditions to identify a red wall when there is no funny business with the lighting conditions, but even if there easily could have been funny business with the lighting-such as a jokester waiting in in the wings, who just so happened not to tinker with the lights, bringing about a lighting condition under which youd believe the wall was red when it was not.3 For some criticism of this distinction, seeKornblith (2004Kornblith ( , 2009Kornblith ( , 2012. Compare, however,Carter and McKenna (2018) for a defence of this distinction in light of Kornbliths criticisms. VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, ENHANCEMENT, AND CONTROL…”

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Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control

Carter¹

2018

Connecting Virtues

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An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa's () recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa's wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza ; Fischer ) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers ; Clark ; Pritchard ; Palermos ; Carter ).. According to Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology (e.g., Sosa , b, a, , passim), the normative structure of epistemic performances can be fruitfully modelled within a wider framework for assessing performances more generally. The basic features of the wider framework are as follows:A. Any performance with an aim can be evaluated along three dimensions: (i) whether it is accurate, (ii) whether it is adroit, and (iii) thirdly, whether it is accurate because adroit.B. A performance in some domain of endeavour D is accurate because adroit when its success issues from a (complete) D competence; such performance are apt.C. A competence, in a given domain of endeavour, is a disposition to perform well in that domain of endeavour.D. Competences have a 'triple-S' constitution-seat, shape and situation-with reference to which three kinds of dispositions can be distinguished: the innermost competence (seat), the inner competence (seat + shape), and the complete competence (seat + shape + situation).

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Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge

Cited by 8 publications

References 48 publications

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

Expanding the scope of reflective knowledge: From MINE to OURS

On behalf of a bi-level account of trust

Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control

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