Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control

Abstract

An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa's () recent thinking is that enhanced performances (e.g., the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance-enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. In this paper, I explore in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa's wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws from both the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza ; Fischer ) as well as from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers ; Clark ; Pritchard ; Palermos ; Carter ).. According to Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology (e.g., Sosa , b, a, , passim), the normative structure of epistemic performances can be fruitfully modelled within a wider framework for assessing performances more generally. The basic features of the wider framework are as follows:A. Any performance with an aim can be evaluated along three dimensions: (i) whether it is accurate, (ii) whether it is adroit, and (iii) thirdly, whether it is accurate because adroit.B. A performance in some domain of endeavour D is accurate because adroit when its success issues from a (complete) D competence; such performance are apt.C. A competence, in a given domain of endeavour, is a disposition to perform well in that domain of endeavour.D. Competences have a 'triple-S' constitution-seat, shape and situation-with reference to which three kinds of dispositions can be distinguished: the innermost competence (seat), the inner competence (seat + shape), and the complete competence (seat + shape + situation).

Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism

“…17 Summing up, then: (i) propositional knowledge requires not just epistemically justified belief, but epistemically autonomous belief (conclusion of §2.1); and (ii) the kind of attitudinal autonomy (viz., of beliefs) that matters for knowledge is different from the kind of attitudinal autonomy that matters for moral responsibility (conclusion of §2.2)-which means that to get an account of it in view, we 17 This is not to say that it would be irrelevant to whether Truetemp knows if in addition to self-arranging the procedure (e.g., by paying a superscientist), Truetemp also came to know the ins and outs of how the device works. (For related discussion on this point, see Carter 2018. Rather, the idea here is just that the relevance of the fact of prior self-arrangement is clear when what's at issue is moral responsibility, and not when what's at issue is whether one possesses knowledge.…”