Knowledge Sharing Willingness and Leakage Risk: An Evolutional Game Model

Li, Qian; Kang, Yuanfei

doi:10.3390/su11030596

Cited by 23 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…According to Relational Embedding eory, interorganizational relational embedding has the essence of trust [10]. When sharing complex information and tacit knowledge [15,16,23,59], organizations will show the characteristics of high cooperation. ey may solve problems together, encourage each other to innovate, 4 Complexity increase the chance of successful innovation, and improve innovation performance [15,16].…”

Section: E Relationship Between Re and Ipflsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Akram et al study the mediating effect of knowledge sharing on the mechanism of organizational justice affecting employee innovative work behavior [15]. For an enterprise, obtaining external resources through knowledge sharing is a passive process [23], depending on the status quo of the partners, while OLC is a process of actively acquiring external resources and knowledge, which is more important for enterprise innovation. However, few scholars have studied the mediating effect of OLC.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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[Retracted] Mediating Effect of Organizational Learning Capacity on the Relationship between Relational Embeddedness and Innovation Performance in Freight Logistics Service

Bai

et al. 2021

Complexity

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Cooperative innovation has become a critical method for freight logistics firms in supply chain management. The previous study has proved that relational embeddedness (RE) has a positive effect on service innovation performance. However, the influence of organizational learning capacity (OLC) has been widely ignored. This study focuses on explaining the mechanism of OLC on the relationship between RE and innovation performance of freight logistics service (IPFLS). Firstly, a theoretical model is constructed based on Social Network Theory, and four research hypotheses are presented. Secondly, a sample of 236 respondents from freight logistics firms in China is analyzed to test the hypotheses. Finally, several management implications and recommendations are suggested. The research results demonstrate that both RE and OLC have positive effects on IPFLS. Meanwhile, OLC partially mediates the relationship between RE and IPFLS. The findings provide practical guidance for managers to strengthen the relationship with partners and enhance OLC.

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Section: E Relationship Between Re and Ipflsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

[Retracted] Mediating Effect of Organizational Learning Capacity on the Relationship between Relational Embeddedness and Innovation Performance in Freight Logistics Service

Bai

et al. 2021

Complexity

Self Cite

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“…Few studies have hitherto discussed knowledge sharing between organizations by applying evolutionary game theory. For instance, Li et al construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the dynamic evolution process of a firm's knowledge sharing behavior in a setting of supply chain networks [52], while Wang et al investigate the behavioral characteristics of interfirm knowledge sharing in innovation clusters [53]. As there is currently no comparative study on the promotion effects of second-and third-party punishments on knowledge sharing that uses evolutionary game theory and an ensuing simulation, we aim to tackle this approach.…”

Section: Applying Evolutionary Game Eory In Analyzing Knowledge Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It refers to the additional benefit generated from knowledge sharing. When both players share knowledge, they may create additional new knowledge due to knowledge fusion and, consequently, reciprocal benefits [52]. e synergy of the two players is affected by the sums of the professional and general knowledge they actually share, which can be expressed as…”

Section: αmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruistic Punishment, Status Conflict, and Knowledge Sharing in the Workplace: An Evolutionary Game Model

Song

et al. 2021

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Second- and third-party altruistic punishments can both improve knowledge sharing, but it is debatable which does so better. We thus concurrently consider the influence of status conflict advantage and disadvantage on knowledge sharing. We also analyze knowledge sharing by introducing an evolutionary game model and conducting simulations, and reveal the following: (1) the appropriate choice for an organization that is increasing its knowledge contribution is third-party punishment; (2) the status conflict advantage and disadvantage play important roles in knowledge sharing. When the status conflict advantage is greater than the disadvantage, the two players eventually share knowledge, and vice versa. Interestingly, when the status conflict advantage is equal to the disadvantage, the player with the stronger sharing inclination has a powerful impact on the player who would rather hoard knowledge, thus ultimately leading him/her to share. (3) Guanxi, knowledge capacity, and synergy revenue have positive effects on knowledge sharing, while the knowledge sharing cost has a negative influence on them. Moreover, the stable equilibrium result is affected by the initial system state. In sum, our results not only promote the understanding of altruistic punishment and status conflict regarding knowledge sharing but also provide practical implications for both organizations and leaders.

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“…As different from simple market transactions, the knowledge sharing behavior faces both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, due to the complexity of knowledge itself and the risk of knowledge sharing, there are some barriers to knowledge sharing among enterprises, such as the loss of competitiveness caused by core knowledge leakage [16,17], free-riding behavior [18], and other trust problems [19], which hampers the knowledge sharing between enterprises. On the other hand, each member in the cluster innovation network has its own expectation to maximize earnings.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Evolution of Knowledge Sharing Behavior among Enterprises in the Cluster Innovation Network Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Kong

Zhu

2019

Sustainability

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Knowledge sharing behavior based on the cluster innovation network has become the primary measure for enterprises to realize sustainable innovation. In order to promote the proactive knowledge sharing behavior among enterprises in the long term, the dynamic evolutionary process and law of knowledge sharing in the network need to be further studied. As different from the hypothesis of the rational man in the classical game theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing behavior in the cluster innovation network based on the evolutionary game theory, and discusses how the bounded rational enterprises can achieve the evolutionary equilibrium through continuously adaptive learning and strategy optimization, further explores the influence factors on the evolutionary trajectory. Combined with mathematical derivation and simulation analysis, the following results are obtained: over time, the dynamic evolution of knowledge sharing behavior in the cluster innovation network is influenced by initial states of the system, but can always reach the evolutionary stable equilibrium; factors such as synergy revenue have a positive impact on the evolutionary results, while factors such as opportunity interest have a negative impact on the evolutionary results; the factor of revenue distribution has a U-shape relationship with the evolutionary results, and the factor of direct revenue has no effect on the results. The results are expected to have an implication for improving the sustainable innovation development of enterprises in the cluster innovation network.

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Knowledge Sharing Willingness and Leakage Risk: An Evolutional Game Model

Cited by 23 publications

References 58 publications

[Retracted] Mediating Effect of Organizational Learning Capacity on the Relationship between Relational Embeddedness and Innovation Performance in Freight Logistics Service

[Retracted] Mediating Effect of Organizational Learning Capacity on the Relationship between Relational Embeddedness and Innovation Performance in Freight Logistics Service

Altruistic Punishment, Status Conflict, and Knowledge Sharing in the Workplace: An Evolutionary Game Model

Dynamic Evolution of Knowledge Sharing Behavior among Enterprises in the Cluster Innovation Network Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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