Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study

Abstract

2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge-viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g.,

Knowledge and mentality

“…8 Beddor & Pavese (2020) discuss at some length some apparent counterexamples to intentional action requiring knowledge that have been proposed in the recent literature on know-how (especially Cath (2015), but also Poston (2009) and Carter & Pritchard (2015)) in which acting on a Gettiered belief allegedly can manifest one's knowhow. We think that these examples are actually not genuine Gettier cases, as some recent experimental results also suggest (Carter et al (2019) and a work in progress by Pavese, Henne & Beddor). A discussion of these cases would bring me too far afield.…”

Taking a Closer Look at the Bayesian Truth Serum

“…All participants were presented with the same list of items as used by Schoenegger (2021) that utilize Likert scales commonly used in psychology and experimental philosophy. Specifically, we included the items on attributions of knowledge-how in conditions of luck (Carter et al, 2019) – Item 1, modesty (Weaver et al, 2017) – Item 2, freedom of choice in situations of nudging (Hagman et al, 2015) – Item 3, the moral permissibility of torture (Spino & Cummins, 2014) – Item 4, the correspondence theory of truth (Barnard & Ulatowski, 2013) – Item 5, moral responsibility (De Brigard & Brady, 2013) – Item 6, and determinism (Nadelhoffer et al, 2020) – Item 7. All items were accompanied by a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree .…”

Experimental Philosophy and the Incentivisation Challenge: a Proposed Application of the Bayesian Truth Serum

“…To test the Bayesian Truth Serum in the context of experimental philosophy, we selected a variety of vignettes from seven articles that had been published in either The Review of Philosophy and Psychology or Philosophical Psychology within the last ten years. Specifically, we included vignettes on attributions of knowledge-how in conditions of luck (Carter et al 2019)example 1, modesty (Weaver et al 2017)example 2, freedom of choice in situations of nudging (Hagman et al 2015)example 3, the moral permissibility of torture (Spino and Cummins 2014)example 4, the correspondence theory of truth (Barnard and Ulatowski 2013)example 5, moral responsibility (De Brigard and Brady 2013)example 6, and determinism (Nadelhoffer et al 2020)example 7. Likert scales were used for all seven examples (six used a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = "Strongly disagree" to 7 = "Strongly agree" while one used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = "Strongly disagree" to 5 = "Strongly agree").…”