‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Kumar, Victor

doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0281-5

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similar concerns can be, and have been, raised about semantic memory . The variety of psychological entities that fall under the heading ‘semantic memory’ is extensive (e.g., propositions, facts, abstractions, schemata, images, rules, language, etc.).…”

Section: Procedural Skills and Semantic Knowledge Are About The Presementioning

confidence: 70%

What memory is

Klein

2014

WIRES Cognitive Science

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term 'memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the 'received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory.

show abstract

Section: Procedural Skills and Semantic Knowledge Are About The Presementioning

confidence: 70%

What memory is

Klein

2014

WIRES Cognitive Science

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…What we seek, then, are the natural properties that account for the kind's presence and causal role. This general approach is common to philosophical study of many putative natural kinds, such as moral properties (Boyd 1988;Sturgeon 1988;Brink 1989; see also Railton 1986), knowledge (Kornblith 2002;Kumar 2014), and a wide range of other psychological categories, such as belief (fodor 1981, 1987), emotion (Griffiths 1997;Prinz 2004), desire (Schroeder 2004), intention (Holton 2009), and concepts (Weiskopf 2009).…”

Section: Natural Kindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychopathy and internalism

Kumar

2016

Can. J. of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Do psychopaths make moral judgments but lack motivation? Or are psychopaths’ judgments are not genuinely moral? Both sides of this debate seem to assume either externalist or internalist criteria for the presence of moral judgment. However, if moral judgment is a natural kind, we can arrive at a theory-neutral criterion for moral judgment. A leading naturalistic criterion suggests that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for moral judgment; the capacity is neither fully present nor fully absent. Psychopaths are therefore not counterexamples to internalism. Nonetheless, internalism is empirically problematic because it is unable to explain psychopaths’ moral deficits.

show abstract

“…section 2). And, pace Cappelen and Winblad (1999), Kornblith (2002), or Kumar (2013), it is not very plausible that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept (cf. Horvath ms.).…”

Section: S (Ford + X) (1) Smith Has Jtb [Suppositional Judgment] S (Fmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Daly¹

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Cited by 12 publications

References 16 publications

What memory is

What memory is

Psychopathy and internalism

The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About