Knowledge about the predictive value of reward conditioned stimuli modulates their interference with cognitive processes

Abstract

Stimuli conditioned with a substance can generate drug-approach behaviors due to their acquired motivational properties. According to implicit theories of addiction, these stimuli can decrease cognitive control automatically. The present study (n = 49) examined whether reward-associated stimuli can interfere with cognitive processes in the absence of knowledge about stimulus-outcome contingencies. Conditioned stimuli (CS) were paired with high-reward (HR) or low-reward (LR) probabilities of monetary reward using a Pavlovian learning task. Participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of contingencies using a Bayesian analysis. CS were then used as task-irrelevant distractors in modified flanker and N-back tasks. Results show HR CS can generate increased interference in the flanker task for participants Unaware of contingencies, contributing further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning. For the N-back task, working memory performance was affected by HR CS, albeit only for Aware participants. These results suggest that CS can interfere implicitly with cognitive processes in a similar way to drug-related stimuli. Such an effect could occur in a stimulus-driven fashion, devoid of top-down goal-directedness. These findings have implications for the conceptualization and study of implicit processes in addiction and highlights the necessity to reconsider the measurement of such phenomena.

Semantic generalization of value-based attentional priority

“…Thus, generalized words captured more attention when associated with high reward rather than no reward in participants unaware of the relationship between conditioned words and reward. This finding, which may seem counterintuitive, fits nicely with prior studies of value-driven attention in which participants as a group are largely unaware of the reward contingencies (Theeuwes and Belopolsky 2012;Anderson 2015), and a recent study in which reward-related interference was particular to unaware participants (Leganes-Fonteneau et al 2019). Our data also showed an unexpected negative Stroop effect in the aware group; although these results should be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size (N = 13), they potentially reflect value-based signal suppression (Gaspelin and Luck 2018).…”

“…We hypothesized that synonyms of words paired with high reward would produce a Stroop interference effect (i.e., would slow down the color-identifying task), relative to synonyms of words paired with low or no reward, because they should be prioritized by attention (due to their semantic association with words related to high reward) and more difficult to inhibit. Prior research suggests that semantic generalization of fear conditioning may be particular to participants aware of the stimulus-outcome contingencies (Grégoire and Greening 2019), while another study found that reward-related interference was particular to unaware participants (Leganes-Fonteneau et al 2019). A secondary research question therefore aimed to assess whether awareness of stimulusreward associations modulated the potential semantic generalization of value-based attentional priority.…”

Pavlovian learning in the selection history-dependent control of overt spatial attention.

“…These findings are consistent with previous studies demonstrating that spatial attentional biases arising from reward learning are contingent upon awareness of the reward contingencies (Mine et al, 2021; Sisk et al, 2020; see also Anderson & Kim, 2018a, 2018b; Liao et al, 2021), which contrasts with the influence of reward learning and aversive conditioning on feature-based attention that can be implicit (Grégoire & Anderson, 2019; Grégoire et al, 2021, 2020; Hopkins et al, 2016; Leganes-Fonteneau et al, 2018, 2019), suggesting a fundamental difference between how selection history shapes feature-based and space-based attentional biases. Like feature-based attentional biases arising from both reward learning and aversive conditioning, however, Pavlovian learning is implicated, which may reflect a broad principle in the selection history-dependent control of attention.…”

“…When it comes to the influence of reward learning and aversive conditioning on attentional biases, there is an apparent dissociation between feature-based and space-based attentional biases with respect to the role of contingency awareness. The learning responsible for the influence of reward and aversive outcomes on feature-based attentional orienting can be implicit, being manifest in participants unaware of the stimulus—outcome contingencies (e.g., Grégoire & Anderson, 2019; Grégoire et al, 2021, 2020; Hopkins et al, 2016), including in studies that rigorously classified participants as unaware on the basis of evidence favoring the absence of awareness using a Bayesian approach (Leganes-Fonteneau et al, 2018, 2019). In contrast, there is evidence that reward-dependent spatial attentional biases are observed only in participants explicitly aware of the location—reward contingencies, with unaware participants showing no evidence of a bias toward the reward-associated location (Jiang et al, 2015; Mine et al, 2021; Sisk et al, 2020).…”

How to use and report Bayesian hypothesis tests.

“…Dienes (2015) applied this heuristic in a couple of cases. For example, meta- d ′ cannot be larger than Type I d ′ (when Type II and Type I decisions are made on the same information); thus, Type I d ′ can be set as a maximum in modeling H1 for meta- d ′ (for an application in implicit cognition see Leganes-Fonteneau, Nikolaou, Scott, & Duka, 2019). Another example is using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) of Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004).…”