Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies

Curtin, Cameron M.; Barrett, H. Clark; Bolyanatz, Alexander; Crittenden, Alyssa N.; Fessler, Daniel M. T.; Fitzpatrick, Simon; Gurven, Michael; Kanovský, Martin; Kushnick, Geoff; Laurence, Stephen; Pisor, Anne C.; Scelza, Brooke A.; Stich, Stephen; Rueden, Christopher von; Henrich, Joseph

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.07.002

Cited by 35 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…Thus, one's preferences become a true indication of action, making behaviour a true window into the mind (the mind becomes knowable) and the best strategy for focus in determining how to interact with another agent (the mind becomes a focus). Thus, this simple socio-ecological difference between tighter norm-based societies like Fiji and looser more individualistic/ autonomous societies like most of the Western world builds the foundation for different models of minds to emerge (Curtin et. al.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Among adults, Opacity of Mind norms appear to shift emphasis in moral reasoning toward outcomes rather than intentions (H. C. Barrett et al, 2016;Curtin et al, 2020;McNamara et al, 2019). For example, many with a western model of mind would focus on intent, leading to judgments that an attempted murder (a bad intention with a good outcome) is worse and worthy of more punishment than an accident (a good intention with a bad outcome).…”

Section: Cultural Models Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

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God's mind on morality

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cultural Models Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

God's mind on morality

et al. 2021

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“…Research from western cultural traditions, and psychology in particular, perpetuates this view that perceiving the mind as the epicenter of all human action is a human universal (see Lillard 1998). However, other cultural approaches to the problem of understanding other people do not place the individual mind on such a pedestal (Curtin et al, 2020;Henrich, 2020). In this paper, we focus on a cultural approach to understanding others that starts from the premise that the minds of others are unknowable.…”

Section: Cultural Models Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Previous work within communities that adhere to Opacity of Mind norms suggest that, though the tasks designed to measure false belief are designed from a stance of a culturally distant model of mind, children in these still pass false belief tasks (albeit at older ages: H. C. Barrett et al, 2013;Callaghan et al, 2005). Among adults, Opacity of Mind norms appear to shift emphasis in moral reasoning toward outcomes rather than intentions (H. C. Barrett et al, 2016;Curtin et al, 2020;. These data suggest some degree of universality in mentalizing cognitive mechanisms, but these mechanisms might be developed under different conditions and function toward slightly different socialcognitive ends.…”

Section: Cultural Models Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We explore how mentalizing is applied in socio-moral reasoning because this allows us to examine mentalizing without directly asking participants in Opacity of Mind communities to state their (potentially rude/ gossiping) inferences about another's state of mind (H. C. Barrett et al, 2016;Curtin et al, 2020;Rita Anne McNamara et al, 2019). Negative Accident Successful Attempt/ Intentional Violation Table 2 Intent/ Outcome Matrix for Intent conditions.…”

Section: Study 2: Moral Violation Vignettes: Manipulate Intent and Oumentioning

confidence: 99%

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God's Mind on Morality

McNamara¹,

Senanayake²,

Willard³

et al. 2020

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Most existing research on beliefs about supernatural agents assumes a Western model of mind that posits a) one can infer others’ thoughts, and b) mental state inference is the best explanation for actions. Other cultures view minds differently. We recruit Indigenous iTaukei Fijian communities who hold 1) a local model of mind that discourages mental state inference and 2) co-existing Christian (Western) and traditional supernatural agent beliefs. Study 1 (N=108), uses free listing to examine how Western and local models of mind relate to beliefs. The Christian God cares about peoples’ internal states and traits (in line with the Western, internally-focused model of mind). Study 2 tests whether evoking God triggers intent focus in moral reasoning. Instead, God appears to enforce cultural models of mind in iTaukei (N=151) and North Americans (N=561). Expected divine judgment mirrors human judgment; iTaukei (N=90) expect God to emphasize outcome, while Indo-Fijians (N=219) and North Americans (N=412) expect God to emphasize intent. When reminded to think about thoughts, iTaukei (N=72) expect God to judge outcomes less harshly. Results hint at cultural/ cognitive co-evolution: introduced cultural forms can spread new cognitive approaches, while Indigenous beliefs can persist as a reflection of local institutions.

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A pluralistic framework for the psychology of norms

Westra

Andrews

2022

Biol Philos

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Social norms are commonly understood as rules that dictate which behaviors are appropriate, permissible, or obligatory in different situations for members of a given community. Many researchers have sought to explain the ubiquity of social norms in human life in terms of the psychological mechanisms underlying their acquisition, conformity, and enforcement. Existing theories of the psychology of social norms appeal to a variety of constructs, from prediction-error minimization, to reinforcement learning, to shared intentionality, to domain-specific adaptations for norm acquisition. In this paper, we propose a novel methodological and conceptual framework for the cognitive science of social norms that we call normative pluralism. We begin with an analysis of the (sometimes mixed) explanatory aims of the cognitive science of social norms. From this analysis, we derive a recommendation for a reformed conception of its explanandum: a minimally psychological construct that we call normative regularities. Our central empirical proposal is that the psychological underpinnings of social norms are most likely realized by a heterogeneous set of cognitive, motivational, and ecological mechanisms that vary between norms and between individuals, rather than by a single type of process or distinctive norm system. This pluralistic approach, we suggest, offers a methodologically sound point of departure for a fruitful and rigorous science of social norms.

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Kinship intensity and the use of mental states in moral judgment across societies

Cited by 35 publications

References 60 publications

God's mind on morality

God's mind on morality

God's Mind on Morality

A pluralistic framework for the psychology of norms

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