Kierkegaard’s Aesthetics and the Aesthetic of Imitation

Kaftański, Wojciech

doi:10.1515/kierke-2014-0105

Cited by 3 publications

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“…It is worthwhile to mention works in the literature which have achieved the rank of classics: [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. 5 Of course, new works analyzing particular stages of existence and attempting to find inspiration for new interpretations of various texts and humanities-related phenomena are constantly appearing (See, for example, [16,17]). However, it seems that there is a noticeable lack of works that interpret this Kierkegaardian concept holistically and try to use it to describe the human world in relation to contemporary socio-cultural reality.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Kierkegaard’s Theories of the Stages of Existence and Subjective Truth as a Model for Further Research into the Phenomenology of Religious Attitudes

Słowikowski

2024

Philosophies

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There are many religions in the human world, and people manifest their religiousness in many different ways. The main problem this paper addresses concerns the possibility of sorting out this complex world of human religiousness by showing that it can be phenomenologically reduced to a few very basic existential attitudes. These attitudes express the main types of ways in which a human being relates to his or herself and the world, independently of the worldview or religion professed by the individual. I use Kierkegaard’s theories of the stages of existence and subjective truth as a model. The theory of the stages of existence provides five basic existential attitudes on the basis of which religious attitudes can develop: spiritlessness, the aesthetic, the ethical, religiousness A, and religiousness B. The theory of subjective truth shows how the concept of truth functions in an ethical and existential sense as the personal truth of an individual engaged in building their religious identity. In turn, I discuss the problem of the relation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to phenomenology, briefly introduce his concept of subjective truth and the stages of existence, and show how existential attitudes can be transformed into religious ones. I also consider the problem of the demonic as the inverted order of this anthropological and existential model. Finally, I argue that the model developed herein may be useful for further research into the phenomenology of religious attitudes.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Religiousness B 16 . This is, for Kierkegaard, the highest possible stage of human existence, one in which the individual experiences in their life the living presence of God (what Kierkegaard calls the second immediacy or the later immediacy- [40] FT, p. 82).…”

Section: Kierkegaard's Theories Of the Stages Of Existence And Subjec...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Kierkegaard’s Theories of the Stages of Existence and Subjective Truth as a Model for Further Research into the Phenomenology of Religious Attitudes

Słowikowski

2024

Philosophies

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Kissing the image: an allegory of imagination in ‘The Seducer’s Diary’

Maughan-Brown

2021

History of European Ideas

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The Problem of Kierkegaard's Socrates

Watts¹

2017

Res Phil.

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This essay reexamines Kierkegaard's view of Socrates. I consider the problem that arises from Kierkegaard's appeal to Socrates as an exemplar for irony. The problem is that he also appears to think that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. And part of the problem is the paradox of self-reference that immediately arises from trying to represent x as unrepresentable. On the solution I propose, Kierkegaard does not hold that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates is in no way representable. Rather, he holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a purely disinterested way. I show how, in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard makes use of 'limiting cases' of representation in order to bring Socrates into view as one who defies purely disinterested representation. I also show how this approach to Socrates connects up with Kierkegaard's more general interest in the problem of ethical exemplarity, where the problem is how ethical exemplars can be given as such, that is, in such a way that purely disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. Socrates … this puzzling, uncategorizable, inexplicable phenomenon (Nietzsche) A plausible general hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he modelled his work as an author on Socrates. This supposition helps to explain many features of his work: his selfwithdrawing and maieutic gestures, his focus on ethical self-knowledge, his eye for paradoxes, his animus against those he regarded as modern-day sophists, his professions of ignorance. 1 Further, 1 This hypothesis has long guided Kierkegaard studies, going back at least to David Swenson's way of introducing Kierkegaard to Anglophone readers, in the 1940s, as a "Danish Socrates" (1983 [1941]). Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal writes, "Kierkegaard's perception of Socrates was decisive for his thoughts and methodology alike" (2014, 259). Critical studies that develop this hypothesis also include Daise 1999; the hypothesis finds ample support in Kierkegaard's own self-assessments, not least a late text that invokes Socrates as the "only analogy" for his own life's work (KW XXIII, 341). 2 And his writings generally abound with references to Socrates, often via a metonym such as, "the simple wise man" (e.g. KW XVII, 241). A second well-attested hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he understood Socrates, first and foremost, as an ironist. 3 This understanding of Socrates is worked out in detail already in Kierkegaard's magister dissertation, On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. Part One of this work purports to show that his being an ironist is not only a possible interpretation of Socrates but that he actually was so and even, in a world-historical perspective, had to be. Later, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the figure of Socrates as ironist will play a leading role as counterpoint to the Hegelian speculative philosophers who, allegedly lacking any sense of irony, confuse themselves with God. And another metonym by which Kierkegaard invokes Socrates ...

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Kierkegaard’s Aesthetics and the Aesthetic of Imitation

Cited by 3 publications

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Kierkegaard’s Theories of the Stages of Existence and Subjective Truth as a Model for Further Research into the Phenomenology of Religious Attitudes

Kierkegaard’s Theories of the Stages of Existence and Subjective Truth as a Model for Further Research into the Phenomenology of Religious Attitudes

Kissing the image: an allegory of imagination in ‘The Seducer’s Diary’

The Problem of Kierkegaard's Socrates

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