The Problem of Kierkegaard's Socrates

Abstract

This essay reexamines Kierkegaard's view of Socrates. I consider the problem that arises from Kierkegaard's appeal to Socrates as an exemplar for irony. The problem is that he also appears to think that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented. And part of the problem is the paradox of self-reference that immediately arises from trying to represent x as unrepresentable. On the solution I propose, Kierkegaard does not hold that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates is in no way representable. Rather, he holds that, as an exemplar for irony, Socrates cannot be represented in a purely disinterested way. I show how, in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard makes use of 'limiting cases' of representation in order to bring Socrates into view as one who defies purely disinterested representation. I also show how this approach to Socrates connects up with Kierkegaard's more general interest in the problem of ethical exemplarity, where the problem is how ethical exemplars can be given as such, that is, in such a way that purely disinterested contemplation is not the appropriate response to them. Socrates … this puzzling, uncategorizable, inexplicable phenomenon (Nietzsche) A plausible general hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he modelled his work as an author on Socrates. This supposition helps to explain many features of his work: his selfwithdrawing and maieutic gestures, his focus on ethical self-knowledge, his eye for paradoxes, his animus against those he regarded as modern-day sophists, his professions of ignorance. 1 Further, 1 This hypothesis has long guided Kierkegaard studies, going back at least to David Swenson's way of introducing Kierkegaard to Anglophone readers, in the 1940s, as a "Danish Socrates" (1983 [1941]). Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal writes, "Kierkegaard's perception of Socrates was decisive for his thoughts and methodology alike" (2014, 259). Critical studies that develop this hypothesis also include Daise 1999; the hypothesis finds ample support in Kierkegaard's own self-assessments, not least a late text that invokes Socrates as the "only analogy" for his own life's work (KW XXIII, 341). 2 And his writings generally abound with references to Socrates, often via a metonym such as, "the simple wise man" (e.g. KW XVII, 241). A second well-attested hypothesis about Kierkegaard is that he understood Socrates, first and foremost, as an ironist. 3 This understanding of Socrates is worked out in detail already in Kierkegaard's magister dissertation, On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates. Part One of this work purports to show that his being an ironist is not only a possible interpretation of Socrates but that he actually was so and even, in a world-historical perspective, had to be. Later, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the figure of Socrates as ironist will play a leading role as counterpoint to the Hegelian speculative philosophers who, allegedly lacking any sense of irony, confuse themselves with God. And another metonym by which Kierkegaard invokes Socrates ...

Practical irony: Reflections on a theme in the work of Jonathan Lear

“…And Watts notes that for Kierkegaard “this list [of essentially human or subjective things] plausibly includes, inter alia , the lives of Abraham, Socrates and Christ; the phenomena of faith, freedom and sin; others qua moral exemplars and oneself qua synthesis of opposing elements; and death” (Watts, 2016, p. 92). More generally, we might say that this category can be understood to comprise “that which pertains to human flourishing and the human good” (Watts, 2017, p. 565) insofar as this is a domain in which existing human beings can be assumed to have a live, subjective interest. So, it is plausible to suppose that our practical identities, insofar as they provide us with “historically determinate, culturally local accounts of various ways in which one might be good at being human” (Lear, 2011, p. 10), likewise fall into this category.…”

“…Watts adds to this the proviso that “‘disinterestedness’ is not to be confused here with emotional detachment or one's being un interested” (Ibid. ); rather, the term disinterestedness is defined in this context as a mode of representational thinking that “transports us outside of the temporal structure of our practical agency” (Watts, 2017, p. 564) such as to fulfill the ideals of universality and objectivity associated with aesthetic judgment and scientific inquiry 6…”

“…There is room for creativity here, as well as argument: one might find a new way of being a friend"(Korsgaard, 2009, p. 21).2 It should be noted that there are special difficulties associated with considering Socrates (or Kierkegaard) as exemplars of ironic existence. For a discussion of these difficulties, seeWatts (2017).3 For a discussion along these lines seeBernstein (2016, 37ff). 4 I say "only roughly" because more complexity would need to be built into the example in order to show how it relates to the crucial notion of practical identity discussed in the previous section.…”

“…2 2 It should be noted that there are special difficulties associated with considering Socrates (or Kierkegaard) as exemplars of ironic existence. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Watts (2017). …”

Kierkegaard, Repetition and Ethical Constancy

“… For a discussion of Kierkegaard's account of ethical exemplars, with particular reference to his portrayal of Socrates and Socratic irony, see Watts (). …”