Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers: A Comparison

Abstract

Nikita Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev both pursued reformist policies during their respective periods as head of the CPSU. Although their policies were very different in substance, the political problems they faced in prosecuting reform were quite similar. The discussion here focuses on the obstacles facing reform-minded Soviet leaders and the options available for overcoming them. Both Khrushchev and Gorbachev were dependent for their position and for the implementation of their policies on a party-state apparat whose interests lay in opposing radical reform and in limiting the leader's power. As a result both men were in a particularly weak position from which to pursue reformist policies.

Mistakes and Demise: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

“…In fact, most of the problems that Gorbachev faced and that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union must be analyzed in terms of his encounters and clashes with the old political and cultural structures. 24 Whether those problems were due to what should be called mistakes or mismanagement is not clear, since Gorbachev in so many ways was caught in structures with a high degree of resistance and durability. He had to challenge the system, but it struck back at him and his reform work, which gave rise to a variety of unintended consequences.…”

Operasjonen var mislykket, men pasientenöverlevde. Den siste sovjetiske alkohol-kampanjen og dens blandede ettermaele

“…Selv om disse begrepene kanskje forutsetter en politisk-adm inistrativ rasjonalitet som var fremmed for det sovjetiske systemet, kan m an likevel definere alkoholkam panjen som en reform. Med "reform " forstår vi da et bevisst forsok på å oppnå en vesentlig endring i fordelingen av verdier, eller adferd, innen et politisk system uten å utfordre regimets konti nuitet eller grunnleggende identitet (Tompson 1993).…”

“…Selv om iverksettingslitteraturen utgår fra vestlige politiske systemer, er det like relevant å snakke om implementeringsproblemer også i det tidligere Sovjetunionen (White 1996:164). V årt biide av et statisk, m onolittisk sovjetisk statsapparat er muligens misvisende (Tompson 1993). Lane og Ross (1994) mener at förvaltningen hadde en relativt stor institusjonell autonom i, hvilket i sin tur bidro til det kom m unis tiske regimets sam menbrudd.…”

“…Mangelen på referanser til alkohol og alko holkam panjen er imidlertid mer forunderlig når det dreier seg om Gorbatsjovs politikk i allminnelighet og den generelle politiske utviklingen i Sovjet unionens siste år. I en sammenligning av Krustsjov og Gorbatsjov som refor m atorer nevnes ikke G orbatsjovs forste store reform forsok overhode (Tompson 1993). M ason har på samme vis et avsnitt som heter " Gorbachev's reforms (1985Gorbachev's reforms ( -1989)", der verken alkohol eller alkoholkam panjen er nevnt (1996:42ff).…”

The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems

“…Single parties (the CPSU in particular) failed to adapt to the political and economic reforms they themselves initiated (Gill 1995, Jowitt 1991. Political reforms were apparently undertaken in order to spur economic change, but they inadvertently undermined the parties' leading role (Tompson 1993:105, McAuley 1992. The goal was to reform ruling parties by introducing some accountability and competition to elected bodies, reducing party functions in the society, allowing greater freedom of discussion (and the expression of contrary views) within the party, and opening up the sphere of politics to the public.…”