Keynote Article: The Treaty of Nice – Negotiating a Poisoned Chalice?

Gray, Mark; Stubb, Alexander

doi:10.1111/1468-5965.39.s1.2

Cited by 33 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson criticized the Nice summit for being organized 'à la italienne' (Le Monde, 12 December 2000). Gray and Stubb (2001), both insiders to the IGC, emphasized the lack of continuity with previous presidencies. Others criticized the chair's bias: President Chirac was accused of an 'unashamed championing of his country's own interest' (European Voice, 14-20 December 2000) and of not listening to the views of others, particularly those of the small Member States (Le Monde, 12 December 2000).…”

Section: The 2000 Igc Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The French were blamed for being arrogant, antagonizing partners, seriously hampering the search for compromises and lacking ambition. As a result, they were accused of bearing responsibility for the poor outcome (Gray and Stubb, 2001). Costa et al (2003) stand out with a much more nuanced view, but this then triggers the question whether they were too positive.…”

Section: The 2000 Igc Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice*

Schout¹,

Vanhoonacker

2006

J of Common Market Studies

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Judging presidencies is easy, evaluating them is not. Evaluations are rare and often superficial. This article provides a theoretical framework for such evaluations. Using contingency theory, it develops hypotheses about the demand for, and supply of, presidency roles. It offers a structured analysis by linking behaviour to the specificities of the actual negotiations. The framework is then applied to the performance of the French presidency during the IGC in 2000. The analysis shows, that apart from the complaints relating to some embarrassing failures, not all the criticism levelled at the French was justified. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Section: The 2000 Igc Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The 2000 Igc Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice*

Schout¹,

Vanhoonacker

2006

J of Common Market Studies

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“…On the political level, the IGC involves meetings of foreign ministers (monthly on the fringes of the General Affairs Council) and summit meetings of heads of state or government (at regular or special European Council). The foreign ministers' meeting is widely regarded as the least effective level, given the lack of time (usually one hour per month) to make headway in the negotiations (Gray and Stubb 2001). Actual political guidance and decisive positioning is therefore left to the European Council where nal bargains are struck and where the threat of national vetoes -and of the ultimate failure of the talks -weighs heavily.…”

Section: Supranational Agency In the Process Of Eu Treaty Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This twin role, however, creates a tension in the perception -and self-perception -of the Commission's role in the IGC process, as these two roles are, to a signi cant extent, mutually exclusive: while a well-de ned and of cially sanctioned position may strengthen the hand of the Commission's negotiators in terms of pursuing that speci c agenda, it weakens their ability to mediate between different and possibly opposing positions among the member states. Mediation is an important part of the Commission's role in the IGC, but the explicit statement of aims contained in its Opinion makes it dif cult to appear as a mediator, and even more so to act as an 'honest broker' (Gray and Stubb 2001).…”

Section: The European Commission and Eu Treaty Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of supranational actors in EU treaty reform

Christiansen¹

2002

Journal of European Public Policy

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Treaty reform, traditionally seen as the preserve of national governments, nevertheless involves supranational actors to a signi cant degree. This article, having re-conceptualized treaty reform as a broader process which includes, but goes beyond, the negotiations of IGCs, looks in some detail at the respective roles of Commission, Parliament and Council Secretariat in this process. In assessing the contribution which these institutions can make, the article concludes that their involvement is different from that of member states, but that their in uence is nevertheless signi cant, pointing to issues such as the institutionalization of the treaty reform process, the legitimation of treaty changes and their command of specialist expertise in what are highly technical negotiations. Given their particular resources in this respect, supranational actors matter in the treaty reform process and ought to be the object of more systematic empirical analysis in the future.

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“…Perhaps most alarming is the fact that the seat distribution in the EP appeared to be simply an 'annex' to the bargaining over new voting weights in the Council and the number of Commissioners; or, as Moberg puts it, quoting an earlier account by Gray and Stubb (2001: 16): seats in the EP were thrown around 'like loose change' to get an overall package deal during the final hours of the Nice negotiations (AM: 280). Hence the anomalies that resulted 1 The adapted voting system was "proposed by the Convention on the Future of Europe in June, which claimed to be an open and democratic exercise.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%