Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved

Abstract

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncontradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within an holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998;2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are statements within an holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as properties of an holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine.

Quine's ‘needlessly strong’ holism

“…26 One could, for instance, modify L's underlying consequence relation. See Tamminga and Verhaegh (2013).…”

“…For if 'p & q ⊨ p' is analytic in Quine's sense, then to deny this logical law is simply to change the meaning of (Arnold and Shapiro 2007, 276-7) There has been considerable controversy about the extent to which the logic-friendly and the radical Quine are compatible, and if not, which one of these characters best approaches the 'real Quine'. 32 With one exception, however, all scholars (including myself, see Tamminga and Verhaegh, 2013) have overlooked the fact that Quine has answered this question explicitly on two occasions. 33 According to Quine, the two perspectives on logic are perfectly compatible because his renewed talk about analyticity does not have any significant 30 Recall Quine's letter to Grünbaum: "I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning; for the cleavage between meaning and fact is part of what, in such contexts, I am questioning" (1962,132).…”

“…31 See also Haack (1977), who distinguishes between a 'conservative' and a 'radical and Parent (2008), who contrasts a 'Principle of Logical Charity' with a 'Revisability Doctrine'. 32 See Haack (1977), Shapiro (2000, 334), Burgess (2004), Maddy (2005, 443), Weir (2005, 463), Arnold and Shapiro (2007), Parent (2008), and Tamminga and Verhaegh (2013). epistemological consequences.…”

Is Everything Revisable?

“…I am leaving aside the interpretation of the claim as not truth-apt; see tamminga and Verhaegh (2013). the revisability claim is usually not being presented and not interestingly taken in this way.…”