Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma

Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics

“…A theory that is not practical is not even a moral theory. I cannot go into this in further detail here (see Bojanowski 2016); let me simply emphasize that I fundamentally agree with Rauscher that the idea that we cognize some mind-independent value property through ‘inner [or] outer intuition’ is incompatible with Kant’s moral epistemology and ontology (p. 218). I do not think, however, that the heteronomy charge against contemporary Kantian realists hits its target.…”

“…Rauscher defines idealism as the view that ‘moral principles, properties, or objects of the world are dependent upon the transcendental … moral agent’ (p. 245). I agree with Rauscher that Kant is a moral idealist (Bojanowski 2012, 2016), but I think we should avoid the term ‘constructivism’ because it does not do justice to Kant’s cognitivism. In other words, Kant is not an idealist merely because moral principles are dependent on the moral agent.…”