2008
DOI: 10.1017/s1369415400001217
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Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature

Abstract: In this paper, I present and defend Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations. I argue that civil society is not primarily a prudential requirement for justice; it is not merely a necessary evil or a moral response to combat our corrupting nature or our tendency to act viciously, thoughtlessly or in a biased manner. Rather, civil society is constitutive of rightful relations among persons because only in civil society can we interact in ways reconcilable with each person's innate right to free… Show more

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Cited by 48 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…See O'Neill 1989. 53 For example, a number of scholars argue that Kant thinks that a rightful state must provide unconditional provision against absolute poverty (See Ripstein 2009;Varden 2008;Wood 2014). Since securing the basic means of survival is a necessity for being a purposive agent, on this reading, Kant thinks that provision against absolute poverty must be provided by public means in order to make the protection of private property consistent with everyone's freedom.…”
Section: Downloaded By [University Of Sussex Library] At 04:47 24 Junmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…See O'Neill 1989. 53 For example, a number of scholars argue that Kant thinks that a rightful state must provide unconditional provision against absolute poverty (See Ripstein 2009;Varden 2008;Wood 2014). Since securing the basic means of survival is a necessity for being a purposive agent, on this reading, Kant thinks that provision against absolute poverty must be provided by public means in order to make the protection of private property consistent with everyone's freedom.…”
Section: Downloaded By [University Of Sussex Library] At 04:47 24 Junmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…54 Kant's practical philosophy may be thought to be associated with what is now called 'ideal theory' but this question is complicated. On the one hand, Kant's account of justice is not that it is a remedial virtue that we need because of deficiencies in the state of nature or human nature, but rather an account of ways in which public law (which involves certain kinds of public institutions) is necessary for individuals who have an innate right to freedom to live together in ways which are consistent with respecting each of their freedom (see Varden 2008). This might make it sound like an ideal theory.…”
Section: Downloaded By [University Of Sussex Library] At 04:47 24 Junmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Kant's argument contributes to the larger argument of this part of the ‘Doctrine of Right,’ which concerns the question of why justice is impossible in the state of nature. I deal with this issue in ‘Kant's Non‐Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature’ (Varden, ).…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Cf. Varden (2008b). Kersting (1992a) finds the Hobbesian argument in Kant, but also an additional argument, which he calls “genuinely Kantian”.…”
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confidence: 99%