Kant’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (i) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (ii) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (iii) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (iv) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

Legitimacy as Public Willing: Kant on Freedom and the Law

“…According to what might be described as an emerging interpretive orthodoxy, agents are externally free to the extent that they “determine their own purposes” (Weinrib , 115) and “get to decide for themselves” (Hodgson , 808). Freedom, that is to say, is the “ability to direct your movements without constraint by others” (Ebels‐Duggan , 897; see also Stilz , 38). The law’s function is to protect this essentially nonrelational form of individual agency by endowing each person with an “equal sphere of discretionary space” within which their choices are to be respected (Pallikkathayil , 133).…”

States of Nature in Immanuel Kant’s Doctrine of Right

“…Bouterwek ([1797] 2014, 246) notes that “no entirely proper claim to property is possible in a state of nature. From this it follows (6:255-6) that I have the right a priori to compel anyone with whom I come to discuss mine and thine to enter into a civil constitution.” Other contemporary interpreters who agree that property exists only in the state for Kant include Pippin (2006, 438), Ripstein (2009, 176), Ebels-Duggan (2012, 898), and Alznauer (2015, 90). Elisabeth Ellis (2005, 114) interprets provisional right as lying between the state of nature and the (ideal) civil condition.…”

The Public Form of Law: Kant on the Second-Personal Constitution of Freedom

“…2Ebels-Duggan 2011, 2012; Hodgson 2010; Korsgaard 2008; Pogge 2004; Sangiovanni 2012; Uleman 2004; Williams 1983.…”

“…7On this ‘descriptive’ conception of external freedom, see Ebels-Duggan 2011; Sangiovanni 2012; Valentini 2012. For the distinction between ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’ conceptions of external freedom, see Ebels-Duggan 2011, 2012; Valentini 2012. For an alternative conception of external freedom, see Byrd and Hruschka 2010 and Uleman 2004.…”

“…For an illustrative example of this debate, see Guyer 2004; Willaschek 2004; Wood 2004. For an argument to the effect that this debate may hide more agreement than disagreement, see Ebels-Duggan 2012.…”