Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations

Tolley, Clinton

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1625-3

Cited by 56 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…I explain this further in §2. 10 For a detailed and very helpful account of the difference between perception and cognition in Kant that I take my discussion here to align with, see Tolley (2017). See also Watkins and Willaschek (2017: 84-87, 101-2).…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity

Sethi

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Few of Kant's distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant's account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according to which judgments of perception are merely subjectively valid because they are made without sufficient investigation. In its place, I argue that for Kant, judgments of perception are merely subjectively valid because they merely report sequences of perceptions had by a subject without claiming that what is represented by the perceptions is connected in the objects the perceptions are of. Whereas the interpretation I criticize undercuts Kant's strategy in the Deduction, I argue, my interpretation illuminates it.

show abstract

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 99%

‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity

Sethi

2020

Journal of Modern Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…See: Sellars (1968). 15 For a discussion of the differences between what Kant means by 'intuition', 'perception'-and other related notions, most notably 'apperception'-see: Tolley (2017).…”

Section: Object-dependency Of (Empirical) Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, on this account, for S to have an empirical intuition of O is for S to be acquainted with O. 45 42 For a defense of 'unconscious intuitions', see: Tolley (2017). 43 Tye (1995: §5.2).…”

Section: Givenness Without Presencementioning

confidence: 99%

A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions

Shahmoradi

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There are passages in Kant's writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they have argued for a relationalist reading of empirical intuitions in terms of an acquaintance relation between the subject and the intuited object. For the sake of argument, I will grant the naïve realist reader of Kant that empirical intuitions should satisfy all the (a)-(e) constraints. Nevertheless, by incorporating these constraints, one by one, into a representationalist theory of empirical intuitions, I will show that not only doesn't a naïve realist reading of empirical intuitions follow, but also that the naïve realist has hastily overlooked a range of perfectly representationalist readings of intuitions available to Kant and his representationalist allies. On the positive side, I will argue that there is an extra constraint on intuitions-i.e., that givenness does not require presence to consciousness-that directly goes against any naïve realist account of intuitions.

show abstract

“…In the secondary literature, compare Grüne (2009: 26, 29, 160ff. ), who maintains that "blind" empirical intuitions can only be made into conscious objective representations through the sensible synthesis of the imagination that makes intuitions "clear"; for views more similar to the present, see Matherne (2015) and Tolley (2017). that to have an empirical intuition of sense, "the object must be represented as present," which sets it off from "an image [Einbildung] as intuition without the presence of the object" (R6315, 18:619).…”

Section: Images Without Empirical Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Tracz¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The role of intuition in Kant's account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms "images" that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even "pure images") actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant's theory of sensibility. K ant famously argues that objects are "given to us" in intuitions and "thought" through concepts, and that both intuitions and concepts are required for "experience" (A50-51/B74-75, A92-3/B125). 1 Kant's bold claims about the opposition between intuition and concept (and between the faculties of sensibility and Contact: R. Brian Tracz

show abstract

Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations

Cited by 56 publications

References 39 publications

‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity

‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity

A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions

Imagination and the Distinction between Image and Intuition in Kant

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About