Kant and Crusius on Belief and Practical Justification

Abstract

Kant’s account of practical justification for belief has attracted much attention in the literature, especially in recent years. In this context, scholars have generally emphasized the originality of Kant’s thought about belief (Glaube), and Kant indeed offers a definition of belief that is very different from views that were prevalent in eighteenth-century Germany. In this article, however, I argue that it is very likely that Christian August Crusius exerted influence on Kant’s definition of belief and his account of practical justification. In turn, acknowledging this influence has relevant consequences for how we understand the phenomenology of Kantian belief.

Faith without hope is dead: moral arguments and the theological virtues

“…4 Jeffrey (2017, 202) notes that both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic strands of the Christian tradition hold a reciprocity thesis about the theological virtues -that to have one of them, the agent must have them all. 5 For example, Guyer (2005aGuyer ( , 2005b, Hare (2005) Palmquist (2009, Chignell (2013bChignell ( , 2014, Ferreira (2014), Fugate (2014), Kleingeld (2016), Gava (2019). 6 Whilst I think that Pieper's discussion of hope can be meaningfully discussed separately from his Thomist, and more generally, Catholic commitments, there is of course a question of how the very different approaches to God and virtues in Kant and Aquinas could be brought into fruitful discussion.…”

“…4.For example, Guyer (2005a; 2005b), Hare (2005), Palmquist (2009), Chignell (2013b; 2014), Ferreira (2014), Fugate (2014), Kleingeld (2016), Gava (2019). …”

Between Faith and Judgement: Kant’s Dual Conception of Moral Certainty

“…4 More precisely, the Canon of Pure Reason is the locus classicus for the discussions of the concepts of belief (Glaube) and rational faith (Vernunftglaube) which, starting from the comparison of belief with the notions of opinion and knowledge, lead into the examination of the concept of rational faith as it is elaborated in the second Critique in relation to the doctrine of postulates. In this regard, see in particular Chignell 2007b;Pasternack (2011 and2014a); Gava (2019). For a discussion focusing instead specifically on Kant's conception of moral certainty, supported by a careful philosophical-historical reconstruction of the prior use of this notion, see especially Fonnesu (2011), to whom I will refer several times below.…”

Metafisika Keterbatasan dan Pluralisme Agama Menurut John Hick

“…Dia berargumen bahwa jika kepercayaan agama dan filosofi terbatas pada satu bentuk saja, maka hal ini akan menghambat kemajuan manusia dalam pencarian kebenaran. Kant percaya bahwa pluralisme tidak hanya memungkinkan manusia untuk berpikir dan bertindak secara bebas, tetapi juga merupakan suatu hal yang diperlukan dalam mencapai kebenaran (Gava, 2019).…”