Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities

Atkinson, Doug; Peijnenburg, Jeanne

doi:10.1215/00294527-2009-005

Cited by 12 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…In several papers we have given counterexamples to this claim. That is, we have demonstrated that a proposition can have a well-defined nonzero probability, even though its probabilistic justification is forever postponed [1], [2], [3], [4].…”

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confidence: 89%

The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg

Atkinson

Peijnenburg

2010

Stud Logica

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We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a well-defined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls 'solvable'. In the present reaction we investigate what Herzberg means by solvability. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making solvability a sine qua non, and we ventilate our misgivings about Herzberg's suggestion that the notion of solvability might help the foundationalist.We further show that the canonical series arising from an infinite chain of conditional probabilities always converges, and also that the sum is equal to the required unconditional probability if a certain infinite product of conditional probabilities vanishes.

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confidence: 89%

The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg

Atkinson

Peijnenburg

2010

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“…As to the second drawback, this is indeed a problem, but matters can be readily repaired (see Atkinson and Peijnenburg , 184). We merely have to insert a threshold t , and require that the degree of justification exceed it:

P (A | B) P (B) + P (A | \neg B) P (\neg B) > t

How high the threshold is in a particular case typically will depend on pragmatic considerations.…”

Section: Two Candidate Definitions and Digmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Need for Justification

Peijnenburg

Atkinson

2014

Metaphilosophy

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Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by 'justification'. Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, we submit a few candidate definitions. We argue that, although not giving the final word, these candidates tell us something about the possibility of infinite epistemic chains. And we show that they can short-circuit a debate about doxastic justification.

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“…(Peijnenburg , 598)(vi) (A belief in) a target proposition E 0 is justified by (a belief in) proposition E 1 , which in turn is justified by E 2 , and so on. (Atkinson and Peijnenburg , 183)(vii) How close should the connection between E n and E n+1 be in order to say legitimately that the one is justified by the other? … In this paper … we regard the justification relation as a probability relation.…”

Section: Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's Accounts Of An Infinite Epistemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

Woudenberg

Meester

2014

Metaphilosophy

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This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.

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Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities

Cited by 12 publications

References 11 publications

The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg

The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg

The Need for Justification

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

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