Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

Abstract

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.

Fading Foundations

“…52 Ibid. 53 René van Woudenberg and Ronald Meester appear to think that we deem probabilistic support to be sufficient for justification (Van Woudenberg and Meester 2014). They criticize our condition (2.1) on the grounds that it allows P(A i |A j ) and P(A i |¬A j ) both to be very small, so that P(A i ) is also very small; in that case (2.1) is fulfilled, but it would be ridiculous to say that P(A i ) is justified.…”

Variaciones del problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación

“…Cf. Atkinson y Peijnenburg (2017), Bergmann (2007), Conee y Feldman (2004), Klein (2005), Pryor (2001), Turri (2010), Woudenberg y Messter (2014). Grimaltos e Isanzo (2009, p. 60) creen que la distinción doxástico/ proposicional es importante, toda vez que "el objeto de discusión acalorada en la epistemología reciente es la justificación doxástica".…”