Jurors'Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message

Abstract

Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex expert testimony. This paper examines jurors’reactions to experts who testify in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility. Based on in‐depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating the expert's credibility.

Likeability and Expert Persuasion: Dislikeability Reduces the Perceived Persuasiveness of Expert Evidence

“…The fact that this did not happen even though jurors were more persuaded by high- than low-quality opinions suggests that jurors may not know how to apply low- and high-quality evidence in their sentencing decisions. This might explain why much of the literature suggests that expert evidence is universally persuasive—jurors may be influenced by the expert–but they also may struggle to incorporate evidence quality into their final judgments (Cutler et al, 1989 ; Ivković and Hans, 2006 ; Daftary-Kapur et al, 2010 ; Bornstein and Greene, 2011 ).…”

“…According to ELM, limited cognitive resources and insufficient knowledge increase reliance on readily accessible but potentially irrelevant, peripheral aspects of a message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984 , 1986 ; San José-Cabezudo et al, 2009 ; Salerno et al, 2017 ). This theory is supported by evidence suggesting that when information is unfamiliar, highly technical or complex—as is often the case for expert opinions—juror evaluations of credibility and persuasiveness may be swayed by superficial features of the expert and their evidence (Chaiken, 1980 ; Heuer and Penrod, 1994 ; Shuman et al, 1994 ; Cooper et al, 1996 ; Schuller et al, 2005 ; Ivković and Hans, 2006 ; Daftary-Kapur et al, 2010 ; Bornstein and Greene, 2011 ; Neal, 2014 ; Maeder et al, 2016 ). Expert likeability is one peripheral cue that may affect perceptions of persuasiveness.…”

“…Given these somewhat impoverished materials, it is possible that the information that was available—including about likeability—may gain undue prominence in decision-making. Where peripheral cues are available, they may even “stand in” for useful but unavailable information (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986 ; Shuman et al, 1994 ; Sporer et al, 1995 ; Cooper et al, 1996 ; Ivković and Hans, 2006 ; Tenney et al, 2008 ). For example, there is evidence that likeability is used to make inferences about expert trustworthiness (Neal et al, 2012 ).…”

How Do Legal Experts Cope With Medical Reports and Forensic Evidence? The Experiences, Perceptions, and Narratives of Swiss Judges and Other Legal Experts

“…The effect of expert testimony on rulings is complex. It is mediated by factors related to the scientific information presented, the medical expert, and the recipient (8). Since such rulings have an impact on individuals and sometimes also on society as a whole (7, 9–13), it is of paramount importance that the medical knowledge on which these decisions hinge be high-quality and comprehensive.…”

Közgazdasági módszerek a jogalkalmazásban és a szabályozásban = Economic tests and expert evidence in antitrust enforcement

“…Empirikusan még alig vizsgálták azt a kérdést, hogy az esküdtek 47 másként tekintenek-e a bíróság által kirendelt szakértőre, mint a felek szakértőire. Fennáll a lehetősége, hogy míg az utóbbiakkal kapcsolatban általában kellően kétkedők az esküdtek (Ivković-Hans, 2003), addig az előbbiekkel kapcsolatos fenntartásokat háttérbe szorítja az a tény, hogy a vélemény 114 megfogalmazóját közvetve semlegesnek kiáltják ki. 48 Pedig a döntési alternatívák (alternatív magyarázatok) kétkedve fogadása a legjobb stratégia, amit egy rosszul informált döntéshozó ilyen helyzetben követhet (Milgrom-Roberts, 1986).…”