This study uses a new criminal case data set to partially replicate Kalven and Zeisel's classic study of judge‐jury agreement. The data show essentially the same rate of judge‐jury agreement as did Kalven and Zeisel for cases tried almost 50 years ago. This study also explores judge‐jury agreement as a function of evidentiary strength (as reported by both judges and juries), evidentiary complexity (as reported by both judges and juries), legal complexity (as reported by judges), and locale. Regardless of which adjudicator's view of evidentiary strength is used, judges tend to convict more than juries in cases of “middle” evidentiary strength. Judges tend to acquit more than juries in cases in which judges regard the evidence favoring the prosecution as weak. Judges tend to convict more than juries in cases in which judges regard the evidence favoring the prosecution as strong. Rates of adjudicator agreement are thus partly a function of which adjudicator's view of evidentiary strength is used, a result not available to Kalven and Zeisel, who were limited to judges’ views of the evidence. We find little evidence that evidentiary complexity or legal complexity help explain rates of judge‐jury disagreement. Rather, the data support the view that judges have a lower conviction threshold than juries. Local variation exists among the sites studied. The influences of juror race, sex, and education are also considered.
Although the domain of law and psychology is a burgeoning and popular field of study, there has never been a concerted effort to evaluate current training models or to develop newer, more effective ones. Forty-eight invited participants attended a national conference held at Villanova Law School to remedy this deficiency. Working groups addressed issues of education and training for the undergraduate level; for doctoral-level programs in law and social science; for forensic clinical training; for joint-degree (JD/PhD-PsyD) programs; for those in practica, internships, and postdoctoral programs; and for continuing education. This article delineates levels and models of training in each of these areas.
For many years, researchers assumed that the public was indifferent to corporate wrongdoing, but recent surveys have discovered evidence to the contrary. Taking insights from these data a step further, this study employed an experimental design to examine whether people responded differently to corporate versus individual wrongdoers. We varied the identity of the central actor in a scenario involving harm to workers. Half the respondents were informed that a corporation caused the harm; the remainder were told that an individual did so. Respondents applied a higher standard of responsibility to the corporate actor. For identical actions, the corporation was judged as more reckless and more morally wrong than the individual. Respondents' judgments of the greater recklessness of the corporation led them to recommend higher civil and criminal penalties against the corporation. * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the Law and Society Association (1986), the Society for the Study of Social Problems (1986), and the American Psychological Association (1987). Writing was facilitated by a NIMH Fellowship in Psychology and Law at Stanford University to Valerie Hans.
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