2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00158.x
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Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances

Abstract: Despite an impressive collection of classical works on the subject, little is known about the frequency or characteristics of Great Power alliance decisions to balance with the weak or bandwagon with the strong. Most works hold that balancing is the predominant Great Power alliance formation behavior, but many examples to the contrary come to mind. We clearly operationalize the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning and find that Great Powers ally with the stronger of two choices (i.e., bandwagon) more often t… Show more

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Cited by 33 publications
(16 citation statements)
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References 23 publications
(26 reference statements)
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“…Disaggregation helps measure the extent to which a country is actually pursuing shared objectives. It helps distinguish between bandwagoning (Sweeney & Fritz, 2004;Cladi & Locatelli, 2012) and balancing -hard (Posen, 2006) or soft (Pape, 2005). Disaggregating avoids conflating spending on collective defense and 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 Figure 5 demonstrates the significant variation in the composition of 2014 defense budgets across the transatlantic community.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Disaggregation helps measure the extent to which a country is actually pursuing shared objectives. It helps distinguish between bandwagoning (Sweeney & Fritz, 2004;Cladi & Locatelli, 2012) and balancing -hard (Posen, 2006) or soft (Pape, 2005). Disaggregating avoids conflating spending on collective defense and 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 Figure 5 demonstrates the significant variation in the composition of 2014 defense budgets across the transatlantic community.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It would propose that China's neighbors bandwagoned with it because it was simply too large to balance (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2009: 375;Schweller, 1994). But such an 'interest-based explanation' (Sweeney and Fritz, 2004) cannot elucidate (a) the obvious distinction the Qing dynasty made between Confucian in-and out-groups in its diplomacy, (b) the missing opportunistic balancing (the logical inverse of bandwagoning) by the Confucian periphery during difficult moments for the Qing (the long 17th-century consolidation and extremely resource-demanding 18th-century western wars), (c) the lack of any detectable anti-Chinese alliance coordination among Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, both among themselves and/or with China's other peripheral targets (extreme anti-Sinic 'underbalancing' [Schweller, 2004]), and (d) China's manifest, 200-year disinterest in invading the Confucian periphery despite ample opportunity and gain to be won. 8 A realist/interest-based approach better fits China's relations with non-Confucians.…”
Section: Findings and Methodological Prebuttalsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Correlates of War project’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) has become widely accepted as an indicator of power (e.g. Geller, 1993; Maoz, 2004; Sweeney and Fritz, 2004). 14 It incorporates an industrial, a military, and a demographic dimension, translating a state’s score into a share of the international system (Singer et al ., 1972; Singer, 1988).…”
Section: Operationalization and Data Sourcesmentioning
confidence: 99%