Judicial Independence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Abstract

In this article, we directly test the presence of judicial independence by examining judicial recess appointees who have later been confirmed by the Senate to full‐time Article III judicial positions. Specifically, we compare the votes of recess‐appointed courts of appeals judges during their temporary appointment tenure with a similar period following Senate confirmation. We find substantial differences in pre‐ and postconfirmation voting, suggesting that the structural protections of the Constitution provide judges a certain amount of independence.

The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting

“…Likewise, judges may simply prefer one political party to another and thus seek to positively influence that party's electoral fortunes irrespective of specific policy goals. Judges may prefer governance by one party over another, or their partisan preferences may be intertwined with their own independent professional or political goals (Graves, Howard, and Corley 2014). For both state judges (who may either aspire to higher judicial office or eventually intend to seek an elected position themselves) and federal judges (who may hope for elevation to a superior federal court), their progressive ambition may lead them to approve district maps that enhance their party's chances in subsequent legislative elections.…”

Institutional Effects on the Careers of State Supreme Court Justices

“…Nevertheless, as envisioned by one of its most vocal proponents, the American Judicature Society (AJS) has contended that retention elections are designed to be used much like impeachment, but not for ideological voting as occurred in Iowa in 2010. 1 Proponents of merit-based selection, including the AJS and American Bar Association (ABA) among others, seek to maximize judicial independence in order to shield judges from inappropriate external influences when interpreting the law (Graves, Howard, and Corley 2014). Notwithstanding the 2010 results in Iowa, these advocates favor the Missouri Plan because they believe that choosing and retaining judges in this manner enables them to make decisions that are free from political or electoral constraints, thus augmenting judicial independence.…”