Judicial Independence and Opinion Clarity on State Supreme Courts

Abstract

We contribute to the literature on judicial independence and performance in the states by analyzing opinion clarity. Written opinions are the primary means of communication for state supreme court justices, and clarity is a core component of judicial performance. Using automated text analysis on a sample of state supreme court opinions from all 50 states, we find that variation in judicial retention systems is not associated with substantively meaningful differences in opinion clarity. Furthermore, elected judges do not seem to produce clearer opinions in salient cases notwithstanding the increased public visibility of those decisions. These results suggest that judges tend to conform to prevailing professional norms despite differing institutional pressures.

Stare Decisisand the Electoral Connection: Do Retention Systems Affect Judges’ Deference to Precedent?

“…Indeed, even precedent—one of the most well-established norms in the judiciary—is subject to disparate treatment by judges who face voters in partisan and/or retention elections. This is an important addition to the ever-expanding literature examining linkages between judicial selection and/or retention systems and judges’ behavior (e.g., Bonneau and Hall 2009; Brace, Yates, and Boyea 2012; Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark 2009; Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2010; Goelzhauser and Cann 2014; Hall 2001; 2007; Yates, Tankersley, and Brace 2010). That said, we stress that ours is an early foray into understanding the manner in which judges treat precedent.…”

“…Moreover, elected judges’ willingness to serve a demanding public appears to transcend case disposition. While Goelzhauser and Cann (2014) found no differences in opinion clarity across selection systems, elected courts handle certain types of cases more efficiently (Goelzhauser 2012), even while writing significantly more opinions than judges who do not run in elections (Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2010). In total, these findings are consistent with a self-interested elected judiciary dispatching cases with an eye on serving constituents, akin to an elected legislator.…”

“…Since 2010, at least five states have discussed (or made) significant changes to the manner in which judicial elections should be funded and/or conducted, often on the basis that proposed changes would make the judiciary more capable, independent, or democratic. These claims are frequently grounded on empirical evidence, since over the same period, the relationship between selection and/or retention systems and a range of outcomes has been a growing topic of scholarly research (e.g., Bonneau and Hall 2009; Brace, Yates, and Boyea 2012; Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark 2009; Choi, Gulati, and Posner 2010; Goelzhauser and Cann 2014; Hall 2001; 2007; Yates, Tankersley, and Brace 2010).…”

The Effect of Opinion Readability on the Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Precedents in State High Courts

“…Finally, we include a measure of Contestable elections that equals 1 for states that use partisan or nonpartisan elections to retain their state high court judges, and 0 otherwise. While evidence reveals that the method of judicial retention has no significant impact on the clarity of those courts' opinions (Goelzhauser and Cann, ), this institutional feature impacts a number of other important behaviors. Thus, while we have no theoretical expectations regarding this variable, we include it to account for a potential alternative influence.…”

Classifying Judicial Selection Institutions

“…Not doing so can be confusing because, for example, the set of selection institutions would not include retention elections. For an example of using “selection” and “retention” interchangeably when the exclusive focus was on retention institutions, see Goelzhauser and Cann (2014, 130).…”