Classifying Judicial Selection Institutions

Abstract

The judicial selection classification problem is widely recognized but poorly understood. In this note, I identify the classification problem's three interrelated sources: ambiguous theoretical arguments, varying decision rules for categorizing merit selection states, and not accounting for interim selections in mixed systems. To demonstrate threats to inference posed by the classification problem, I replicate a study on opinion writing productivity in state supreme courts. I also offer straightforward suggestions for resolving the classification problem. Eliminating the classification problem will help ensure that inferences are comparable across studies with respect to the consequences of institutional design choices concerning state judicial selection mechanisms.

Selecting Chief Justices by Peer Vote

“…8. At the federal level, there is evidence that judges sometimes suppress separate opinions for collegial reasons (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013;Fife et al 2017;Goelzhauser 2015a;2015b;2016b) 9. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.…”

Judicial Merit Selection: Beliefs about Fairness and the Undermining of Gender Diversity on the Bench

“…In the other procedure, a commission generates a short list of candidates from which the governor selects a judge to fill the vacancy (merit selection). Of course, merit and gubernatorial selection are not the only ways in which judges are selected in the United States; state court judges are also selected through partisan elections, non-partisan election, legislative election, and supreme court/chief justice selection (Reddick, Nelson, and Caufield 2010), although classifying selection systems is not always straightforward (Goelzhauser 2018a).…”

“…2.There is, of course, variation across merit selection systems and the ways in which systems are classified (Goelzhauser 2018a). About two-thirds of U.S. states that use merit selection also employ retention elections.…”

Stare Decisisand the Electoral Connection: Do Retention Systems Affect Judges’ Deference to Precedent?

“…Our central goal is therefore to determine whether the manner in which judges are retained for an additional term on a state court of last resort affects the probability that they will depart from precedent. Goelzhauser (2018) cautions that the myriad systems that states employ can lead to questionable classifications, and advises both careful theorizing and transparency when it comes to comparing outcomes in various judicial systems. 2 For instance, in Alabama and seven other states, judges run in partisan elections akin to most legislative elections in the United States.…”