Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel

doi:10.1037/e301492005-001

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“…(2) How shall we understand the role of content and structure in reasoning? In the dominant program on probabilistic reasoning, the heuristics and biases program (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). the formal structure of a 'These results were taken by many colleagues as a demonstration of reasoning errors in human subjects.…”

Section: Research On Deductive and Probabilistic Reasoning: Some Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change

1992

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Section: Research On Deductive and Probabilistic Reasoning: Some Commmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change

1992

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“…The judge may make this judgment by initially assessing, say, the relative frequency of journalists and then adjusting upward to account for additional people who work as realtors (see Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997). Because adjustments of this sort are typically insufficient (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968;Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), this analysis implies that in class judgments support for disjunctions may be monotonic but subadditive. For example, s(journalist or realtor) Ͼ s( journalist) but s(journalist or realtor) Ͻ s(journalist) ϩ s(realtor).…”

Section: In Terms Of Our Example S(journalist or Realtor) ͻ S(journamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The fallacy presumably arises because Linda appears more similar to or better matches a feminist bank teller than a bank teller. A reliance on the assessment of similarity as an input to judgment has also been shown to contribute to base-rate neglect and nonregressive prediction (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974;Griffin & Tversky, 1992;Bar-Hillel & Fischhoff, 1981), insensitivity to sample size (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971;Borgida & Nisbett, 1977), illusions of covariation assessment (Jennings, Amabile, & Ross, 1982;Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969, and misconceptions of random processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972;Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985;Wagenaar & Bar-Hillel, 1991).…”

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“…Similarity is a natural mechanism in judging the likelihood that Linda is a bank teller, for example, but may be far less natural in the judging the likelihood that a cure for AIDS will be discovered before the year 2000. Indeed, much classic work on probability judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) emphasizes the notion that different mechanisms are applied to different judgment tasks. Likewise, we should note that the term similarity refers to a collection of psychological mechanisms.…”

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Similarity between Hypotheses and Evidence

Rottenstreich

Brenner

Sood

1999

Cognitive Psychology

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We explore two novel consequences of similarity-based likelihood judgment. In Section I, we distinguish between the evidence on which judgments are based and the hypotheses that serve as the objects of judgment. The location of a feature, whether in the evidence or the hypotheses, influences the perceived similarity between evidence and hypotheses and consequently yields judgments that are inconsistent with the requirements of probability theory. In Section II, we examine judgment of disjunctive hypotheses. For certain types of disjunctions, the assessment of similarity produces consistent nonmonotonicities: the support of a disjunction is smaller than that of one of its components. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings in terms of support theory and the principle of context independence. © 1999 Academic PressA great deal of research has uncovered numerous effects that arise when assessments of similarity form the basis for judgment under uncertainty. For example, in a classic demonstration of the conjunction fallacy, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found that an outspoken, socially conscious, and single woman named Linda was judged more likely to be a feminist bank teller than a bank teller, despite the fact that the former category is included within, This is truly collaborative work, the order of authorship is arbitrary. We thank

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“…Specifically, the psychological literature suggests that people rely on various mental strategies or cognitive processes to simplify and evaluate complex risk information (Slovic et al, 1979;Fischhoff et al, 1981;Slovic, 1987). These judgmental rules (frequently termed ''heuristics'') are typically based on past experience and intuition (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). For example, according to the availability heuristic, events are perceived as more frequent or likely to occur if they are easy to imagine or recall.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health risk communication using comparative risk analyses

Williams¹

2004

J Expo Sci Environ Epidemiol

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The ability to communicate effectively the degree or magnitude of public exposures or health risks is essential for risk assessors and risk managers. Various guidelines exist for communicating environmental and public health risks, including recommended approaches for putting risk data into proper context. Although it remains unclear as to which approach is the most useful or appropriate under different circumstances, risk comparisons are a popular choice for conveying the significance of or providing a better perspective on a particular chemical exposure or health risk. In this paper, several different types of risk comparisons are described that are frequently used in the private and public sectors, and these are illustrated using a variety of examples from the literature. These approaches include: (1) intrachemical comparisons, (2) interchemical comparisons, (3) comparisons to background levels of risk, (4) comparisons to theoretical risks or safety levels, and (5) comparisons to other actions or activities. The primary purpose of this paper is to summarize and briefly discuss the advantages and limitations of these risk communication approaches. The evolving field of risk communication is also discussed, including ongoing research on public risk perceptions and alternative methods for communicating risk magnitudes and data uncertainties. Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental Epidemiology IntroductionThe ability to communicate effectively the degree or magnitude of public exposures or health risks is essential for risk assessors and risk managers (Williams, 2000). Risk communication is the process of conveying information about an exposure, risk, or risk management decision (NRC, 1989). More specifically, risk communication can be defined as ''any public or private communication that informs individuals about the existence, nature, severity, or acceptability of risks '' (Plough and Krimsky, 1987). Communicating risks often involves interpreting available scientific evidence, and describing and summarizing scientific knowledge about exposure and risk issues (NRC, 1989). Risk communication can also be used to influence public opinion or choice, or to arouse or alleviate public concerns about a risk issue (Kasperson et al., 1988;Sandman, 1993). The history of risk communication as applied to environmental and public health risks has not been fully documented, but has clearly evolved through several developmental stages over time (Fischhoff, 1995) and may have been influenced by the desire to gain acceptance for decisions grounded in risk assessment methods (Plough and Krimsky, 1987) or the organizational adaptation of chemical manufacturers to external pressures (Chess, 2001).Over the last 20 years, various guidelines have been published for communicating environmental and public health risks. For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has produced several risk communication reports and case studies as part of their mission to explain the public health hazards associated...

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Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Cited by 2,462 publications

References 0 publications

Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change

Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, cheating, and perspective change

Similarity between Hypotheses and Evidence

Health risk communication using comparative risk analyses

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