John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric

Eisgruber, Christopher L.; Marshall, John

doi:10.1086/scr.1996.3109735

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…By working in this register, Marshall avoids "Practical arguments about likely results," which "inevitably depend upon controversial empirical claims." 56 This, in turn, avoids appealing to "factual necessity," a precedent courts have since avoided with regard to takings. At the same time, through the control of key concepts, Marshall imposes order over quarrels about particulars.…”

Section: Necessary and Proper: Necessity In Mcculloch V Maryland 1 Reading Mccullochmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eminent Domain and the Rhetorical Construction of Sovereign Necessity

Skinner

Feldman

2012

Law, Culture & the Humanities

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This article examines the logic of necessity in eminent domain cases in the United States. While much has been written about “public use” justifications as adjudicated by courts, less attention has been paid to necessity. In part this is because public use is an explicit part of Fifth Amendment limitations on “takings” while necessity is part of the buried logic of sovereignty that grounds its exercise. Readings of pivotal cases from McCulloch to Kelo lead us to question recent attempts to revive necessity as a legal standard for reining in eminent domain power.

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Section: Necessary and Proper: Necessity In Mcculloch V Maryland 1 Reading Mccullochmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eminent Domain and the Rhetorical Construction of Sovereign Necessity

Skinner

Feldman

2012

Law, Culture & the Humanities

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“…Ello da como resultado la generación de una capacidad de respuesta a los problemas sociales pasible de ser aceptada por el resto del sistema político. 31 29 Eisgruber (1996) analiza los cambios entre la retórica judicial de la Corte Suprema en tiempos de Marshall y las Cortes actuales y sostiene que el principio de objetividad y neutralidad es característico de estas últimas, al estar demasiado preocupadas por su legitimidad contra-mayoritaria. En tiempos de Marshall, expresa Eisgruber, esas preocupaciones no existían y sí lo hacía, en cambio, una preocupación por la legitimidad del derecho americano, en general.…”

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