Johannes von Kries’s Objective Probability as a Semi-classical Concept. Prehistory, Preconditions and Problems of a Progressive Idea

Pulte, Helmut

doi:10.1007/s10838-015-9317-5

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Influenced by the physics of the 19 th century, it was important to von Kries to distinguish between laws of nature and initial conditions (Pulte, 2016). Unlike Laplace, who reduced probability to incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, von Kries built up probabilities from objective variations of initial conditions, and he called the sets of admissible initial conditions "Spielräume," which are best translated as "sets of possibilities".…”

Section: Typicality Frequentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike Laplace, who reduced probability to incomplete knowledge of the initial conditions, von Kries built up probabilities from objective variations of initial conditions, and he called the sets of admissible initial conditions "Spielräume," which are best translated as "sets of possibilities". 1 More quantitatively, von Kries defined the probability for an event E in the following way (see Pulte, 2016, section 5, for this reconstruction). Let us say that the event E is brought about by the set of initial conditions C (given certain laws of nature) and the set of initial conditions that do not bring about E is C * (C would be then the "Spielraum" or set of possibilities for E).…”

Section: Typicality Frequentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reviving Frequentism

Hubert

2021

Preprint

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Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities.

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Section: Typicality Frequentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Typicality Frequentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reviving Frequentism

Hubert

2021

Preprint

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“…Although the content of pure mathematics changed during the nineteenth century, 11 for Jacobi it referred to the idea of an a priori knowledge independent of every empirical element, based only on the laws of thought (Pulte 2016, 114). As a priori knowledge, it possesses absolute certainty and evidence.…”

Section: Convention In Mechanics: Jacobi Reech and Poincarémentioning

confidence: 99%

From Jurisprudence to Mechanics: Jacobi, Reech, and Poincaré on Convention

Paz¹

2018

Sci Context

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ArgumentThis paper aims at understanding the concept of convention in mechanics as a notion transferred from the field of jurisprudence. This enables us to clarify it as a new epistemic category having a pertinent role in the transformation of mechanics in the nineteenth century. Such understanding permits a separation from linguistic and arbitrary conventions, thus highlighting its epistemic features and not transforming fundamental principles into mere arbitrary agreements. After addressing the main references in the literature discussing the role of convention in mechanics, we analyze its classical use as a concept originating from law. Then we explain its use by Carl G. Jacobi, Ferdinand F. Reech, and J. Henri Poincaré. Here we also show how their uses conform to the features analyzed regarding conventions in jurisprudence. Finally, we try to explain how the use of this concept, among other factors, contributed to the transformation of mechanics.

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“…He repeats this same quoted phrase (Weber 1913 [1981]:159; see also Weber [1921–1922] 2019:86) in the 1913 Logos essay. As far as anyone can tell, this quoted phrase comes directly from von Kries (see Pulte 2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Chance, Orientation, and Interpretation: Max Weber’s Neglected Probabilism and the Future of Social Theory

Strand

Ližardo

2022

Sociological Theory

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The image of Max Weber as an “interpretivist” cultural theorist of webs of significance that people use to cope with a meaningless world reigns largely unquestioned today. This article presents a different image of Weber’s sociology, where meaning does not transport actors over an abyss of meaninglessness but rather helps them navigate a world of Chance. Retrieving this concept from Weber’s late writings, we argue that the fundamental basis of the orders sociologists seek to understand is not chaos. Action is rendered interpretable, rather, to the extent persons orient themselves to possibilities and probabilities, which remain real but unknowable. In this framework, interpretation and probability are allies, not antagonists. Weber’s systematic use of the probabilistic notion of Chance as a central resource for concept formation and sociological explanation seriously challenges current understandings of probability as a purely statistical, atheoretical concern. We outline the conceptual difference it makes when basic categories of sociology are understood as rooted in Chance, and we point to the larger implications of Weber’s probabilism for contemporary debates around issues of prediction, action, and interpretation.

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Johannes von Kries’s Objective Probability as a Semi-classical Concept. Prehistory, Preconditions and Problems of a Progressive Idea

Cited by 7 publications

References 12 publications

Reviving Frequentism

Reviving Frequentism

From Jurisprudence to Mechanics: Jacobi, Reech, and Poincaré on Convention

Chance, Orientation, and Interpretation: Max Weber’s Neglected Probabilism and the Future of Social Theory

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