IX-Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice

Abstract

Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non‐arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes, that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative principles of stakes amounts to fleshing out the demands of responsibility rather than imposing limits on them.

Distributions and Relations: A Hybrid Account

“…Here is not the place for a complete defence of the plausibility of this strategy. Rather, what matters is that this reply exploits the fact that it is consistent with the claim that we have reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources that we also have reasons to limit individuals' use of those resources, as well as the level of disadvantage to which various choices may give rise (Olsaretti, 2009;Stemplowska, 2016;Williams, 2006). By pursuing this route, defenders of distributive egalitarianism are able to articulate its demands in a way that coheres with the demands of social egalitarianism, such that we need not have to pick between the two.…”

Why not be a desertist?

“…In addition to Miller (2001) and Mulligan (2018), see Dekker (2008Dekker ( , 2010, Hsieh (2000), and Sheffrin (2013). 14 The Burning House is similar in structure to examples considered by Dekker (2009), Eyal (2007, Moriarty (2018), Olsaretti (2009), Stemplowska (2009), and Temkin (2003. We raise new objections to the solutions that they propose for accomodating rewards for costly, praiseworthy actions within luck egalitarian theory.…”

May a Government Mandate more Comprehensive Health Insurance than Citizens want for Themselves?

“…It also holds that inequalities that are due to competent, free, and informed choice against an equal background need not be unfair (see, e.g., Cohen 1989;Arneson 1989;Temkin 2001 people who face equal opportunities. Brute luck egalitarians must therefore rely on distinct principles to decide which choice-based inequalities to countenance (Olsaretti 2009;Stemplowska 2009;Segall 2010, chap. 4).…”