2018
DOI: 10.1177/0032321718755589
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Abstract: There is a deep divide among political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such as non-dominati… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
8
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 30 publications
(9 citation statements)
references
References 44 publications
1
8
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Before engaging with specific institutional proposals, I here take a step back and first unearth a deeper theoretical connection between relational equality and responsibility. 5 Some egalitarians find such a combination attractive (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015;Moles and Parr 2019;Wellman 2008, 121-23), whereas most relational egalitarians would probably hesitate, considering the many objections they have raised to luck egalitarianism, including: the choice-circumstance distinction disregards that inequalities resulting from social structures are more troubling than inequalities resulting from 'non-social' factors (Young 1990, chap. 1); luck egalitarianism (and distributive egalitarianism more generally) fails to consider that inequalities are not only about what we get but also about how we are treated (Anderson, 1999;Pogge, 1995;Schemmel, 2012); luck egalitarianism would require government intrusion (Anderson, 1999;Scheffler, 2003;Wolff, 1998); luck egalitarianism has an implausibly wide scope; is sometimes too harsh (Anderson, 1999;Fleurbaey, 1995;Scheffler, 2003); builds on a simplistic yet unrealistic distinction between choice and circumstance (Scheffler, 2003); and lands us problematically deep in the free will problem (Fleurbaey, 2008, chap.…”
Section: The Responsibility Challengementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Before engaging with specific institutional proposals, I here take a step back and first unearth a deeper theoretical connection between relational equality and responsibility. 5 Some egalitarians find such a combination attractive (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015;Moles and Parr 2019;Wellman 2008, 121-23), whereas most relational egalitarians would probably hesitate, considering the many objections they have raised to luck egalitarianism, including: the choice-circumstance distinction disregards that inequalities resulting from social structures are more troubling than inequalities resulting from 'non-social' factors (Young 1990, chap. 1); luck egalitarianism (and distributive egalitarianism more generally) fails to consider that inequalities are not only about what we get but also about how we are treated (Anderson, 1999;Pogge, 1995;Schemmel, 2012); luck egalitarianism would require government intrusion (Anderson, 1999;Scheffler, 2003;Wolff, 1998); luck egalitarianism has an implausibly wide scope; is sometimes too harsh (Anderson, 1999;Fleurbaey, 1995;Scheffler, 2003); builds on a simplistic yet unrealistic distinction between choice and circumstance (Scheffler, 2003); and lands us problematically deep in the free will problem (Fleurbaey, 2008, chap.…”
Section: The Responsibility Challengementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sufficientarians can deny the intrinsic distributive importance of equality and still claim its relational relevance for justice, explaining why this version of BIO is morally problematic while keeping its commitment to NT thereof. Drawing on the recent debate about the possibility of reducing relational egalitarianism to distributive egalitarianism -or vice versa - (Moles & Parr, 2019), the next section explores two strategies for incorporating relational concerns into the sufficientarian framework (Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018). The first is to object to the outcome of Hospital by internalizing relational issues and claim that unequal distributions and disrespectful relations matter insofar as they affect individuals' absolute levels of advantage.…”
Section: The Sufficiency View and The Blindness To Inequality Objectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of BIO comes from relational and not distributive inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other (Cordelli, 2015;Axelsen & Bidadanure, 2018;Gheaus, 2016;Moles & Parr, 2019), I will canvass the strategies of internalizing and externalizing relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework, and suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions. But I will also argue that a hybrid view that endorses a particular form of distributive sufficiency, which internalizes some relational aspects, but accepts that others are non-reducible, is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 3. Although the idea of connecting social egalitarianism and distributive egalitarianism is in the early stages in the literature, a recent approach can be found in Moles and Parr (2019), which suggests the debate between distributive egalitarians and social egalitarians can be re-articulated in terms of claims about reasons, that is, instead of analysing the debate conceptually in terms of the nature of the demands of equality, we must examine the reasons in favour of equality. The work here might build on Parr and Moles’ argument in the sense that distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism have a shared reason – grounded in preventing exploitation – to secure distributional and social equality.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%