Iv.—discussions: The Problem of the Speckled Hen

Chisholm, Roderick M.

doi:10.1093/mind/li.204.368

Cited by 66 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…For further discussion, see Ayer 1940, Jackson 1977, Pautz 2007, or Tye 2009. A more germane use of the speckled hen is to challenge traditional foundationalist views in epistemology, according to which we have extremely privileged access to our experiences (this application arguably starts with Chisholm 1942). In particular, Sosa (2003) uses the case to argue that beliefs about our experiences can meet foundationalist criteria for being justified, while in fact failing to be justified.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Silins

2011

Mind

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Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the proposal that, if your experience E immediately justifies you in believing that P, then (i) E has the content that P, and (ii) E's having the content that P is fixed by what it's like to have E. I start by clarifying this proposal and showing how it can be defended. I then argue against the proposal and develop an alternative. The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays (and doesn't play) in the justification of perceptual beliefs.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Silins

2011

Mind

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“…What about a case in which one notices a qualitative difference, but it is not obvious what perceptual capacities one is employing to account for the difference in the sensory character of one's experience? One such case is that in which one first sees a hen with 48 speckles and then sees a hen with 47 speckles (Chisholm 1942).…”

Section: Speckled Henmentioning

confidence: 99%

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Schellenberg

2015

Philos Stud

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Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better epistemic position when we perceive than when we hallucination. In this paper, I develop the capacity view, that is, the view that perceptual experience has epistemic force in virtue of the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of the perceptual capacities employed in perception. By grounding the epistemic force of experience in facts about the metaphysical structure of experience, the capacity view is not only an externalist view, but moreover a naturalistic view of the epistemology of perceptual experience. So it is an externalist and naturalistic alternative to reliabilism. I discuss the repercussions of this view for the justification of beliefs and the epistemic transparency of mental states, as well as, familiar problem cases.

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“…A well-known problem in this arena is Chisholm's (1942) problem of the speckled hen. Exactly which types of belief about one's own present experience are justified?…”

Section: Justification and Fittingness With Non-doxastic Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism?Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package

Goldman¹

2012

Reliabilism and Contemporary EpistemologyEssays

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For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification. 1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called "Evidentialist Reliabilism." He tries to show how each theory can profit by borrowing elements from the other. Comesana concentrates on reliabilism's problems and how it might be improved by infusions from evidentialism. This paper follows a similar tack. My emphasis, however, is the reverse of Comesana's. I highlight problems for evidentialism and show how it could benefit by incorporating reliabilist themes. I am not sanguine that evidentialists will see it my way.They might even view my proposals as an insidious attempt to convert evidentialists to reliabilism. Well, I won't debate the best way to formulate this paper's recipe. At any rate, it began with the idea (which anteceded my reading of Comesana) of creating a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism. It retains significant strands of that idea, although the synthesis theme does not pervade the entire paper.What is mentalist evidentialism? Its original formulation was succinct:[EJ] Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t. (Feldman & Conee, 1985.I begin by raising worries about the notions of evidence and fittingness that are crucial to evidentialism as formulated by [EJ]. To help with many of the problems raised, I recommend supplements borrowed from reliabilism. As we proceed I shall also present reasons why reliabilism might be improved by doses of evidentialism. 1. The Concept of Evidence in EvidentialismA theory of justification that calls itself "evidentialism" and makes evidence possession its focus can reasonably be asked to explain which concept of evidence it means to invoke. If the only viable concept of evidence available to it introduces elements from a "foreign" approach such as reliabilism, this should provide some motivation toward a synthesis or unification with that approach. This is the situation

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Iv.—discussions: The Problem of the Speckled Hen

Cited by 66 publications

References 0 publications

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism?Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package

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