“It’s the political economy . . .!” A moment of truth for the eurozone and the EU

Dani, Marco; Chiti, Edoardo; Mendes, Joana; Menèndez, Agustín José; Schepel, Harm; Wilkinson, Michael

doi:10.1093/icon/moab019

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Although attempting to squeeze the ECB back into its narrow Treaty mandate of price stability, in reality it demonstrates the difficulties of a distinction that rests on a legal fiction: the fiction that the conduct of monetary policy can be detached from economic policy and insulated from political interference. 57 Moreover, there has been also significant research on how the ECB's policy (especially its unconventional monetary policy) has had distributional consequences, 58 and on how the general design of central banks as independent is related to the rise of income inequality. 59 Acknowledging the economic dimension of monetary policy means acknowledging that independent central banks play a political (and not only a technical) role.…”

Section: Independent Central Banks: the Example Of The Ecbmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remarks on Johan van der Walt’s Concept of Liberal Democratic Law

Vagdoutis¹

2023

Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy

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Section: Independent Central Banks: the Example Of The Ecbmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remarks on Johan van der Walt’s Concept of Liberal Democratic Law

Vagdoutis¹

2023

Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy

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“…Garner (2020). Dani et al (2020). The most interesting feature of this decision is that CJEU made a comment regarding the possible justification of the public policy clause in light of the fundamental rights.…”

Section: Hungarian Journal Of Legal Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional identity in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Orbán

2022

HJLS

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Court rulings and publications on constitutional identity have spread in a sort of viral way since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Accordingly, many scholars analyse the possible sources of the term and the risks associated with its use, including the fact that opponents of constitutional democracy can use it as a great weapon, as there is no objective standard in terms of its content. In this regard two different positions can be distinguished concerning the function of the constitutional identity clause and the determination of the content elements of the constitutional identity. The first perspective looks at the notion of identity as a manifestation of Euroscepticism, according to which the identity clause is in fact a possible form of derogation under obligations deriving from European integration. In contrast, the second perspective leads to a cooperative interpretation of the concept of identity, if you like, an integration-friendly dissolution of the concept of sovereignty in a sort of post-Westphalian meaning of identity, which can be linked to the concept of ‘unity in diversity’. Accordingly, Article 4 (2) TEU allows for the articulation of individual Member State specificities and establishes a mechanism in which different Member State and supranational perspectives can be harmoniously aligned with each other. This paper looks at Article 4 (2) TEU as an embodiment of the idea of ‘cooperative constitutionalism’ having the function of a ‘valve’ and presents all the relevant cases where constitutional identity as a legal standard has been raised in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union up to 2020.

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“…111). The spectacular opposition of the German Federal Constitutional Court to this move (German Federal Constitutional Court 2020 ) remains essentially biteless (but see Dani et al, 2021 ). The result is a redefinition of monetary goals in the most expansive possible ways, including the acquisition of public debt in secondary markets in massive amounts.…”

Section: From European Government With Numbers To European Economic G...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Numerical rules or political government, that is the (European) question

Menèndez

2022

Comp Eur Polit

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Numerical rules can be defined as legal rules, the operative part of which is an economic indicator. This peculiar recombination of the technologies of government through law and governance by numbers is the result of the return of the regulatory ideal of neutral government in the 1970s (powered by the amalgamation of ordoliberal and neoliberal ideas into what may be called neo-ordo-liberalism) and the search for solutions to the contradiction at the heart of European integration after 1971: the will to have a common currency without the will and institutional means to ensure its political government. The ground for the emergence of European numerical rules was laid by the establishment of the European Monetary System in the late 1970s, which resulted in the subjection of national monetary policy (and to a lesser extent, national fiscal policy) to relevant economic constraints. European numerical rules were codified and thus juridified in the Maastricht Treaty, concretised in the Stability and Growth Pact, and retooled in the wake of the financial, economic and fiscal crises of the 2010s. Cumulated experience confirms that the elimination of discretion in the process of application of numerical rules is an illusion. In fact, resort to economic indicators to define the operative part of legal rules does not do away with discretion, but merely changes the way in which discretion is exerted. This is so because economic indicators are not sources of objective and impartial economic knowledge, but social constructs, open indeed to be articulated in different forms. The curious case of the structural deficit as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact illustrates the point quite vividly. The need to resort to discretion in the process of application of numerical rules should be explicitly acknowledged instead of denied. Otherwise, the result will be the cloaking of discretionallty, which breeds arbitrariness.

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“It’s the political economy . . .!” A moment of truth for the eurozone and the EU

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Remarks on Johan van der Walt’s Concept of Liberal Democratic Law

Remarks on Johan van der Walt’s Concept of Liberal Democratic Law

Constitutional identity in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Numerical rules or political government, that is the (European) question

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