Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

Mikulaschek, Christoph

doi:10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9

Cited by 25 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…27 One widely used proxy for the political influence of a country is its temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UNSC members have clout with major powers for exactly their two years of temporary membership, given that powerful governments care about UNSC voting of minor powers (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Mikulaschek 2018. Previous research suggests that UNSC members can exploit their temporary leverage to ask the World Bank's major shareholders to support their loan applications (Dreher et al 2009b.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending

Dreher

Lang

Richert

2019

Journal of Development Economics

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Much of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) lending benefits private companies from rich countries and supports projects in middle-income countries. Large corporations such as Lidl or Mövenpick have received its loans for highly profitable investments. This contrasts to some extent with the IFC's official mandate, which is to finance poverty-reducing projects for which private capital is not available on reasonable terms. Investigating a potential driver of this mismatch, we argue that some governments can influence the allocation of IFC loans to the benefit of private companies in their countries. Using new data for more than 3,000 IFC projects over the 1995-2015 period we show that (joint) IFC Board membership of countries where borrowing companies are based and of countries where the projects are implemented increases the likelihood that these countries receive IFC loans. This has implications for the debate on leveraging private-sector investments for development.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending

Dreher

Lang

Richert

2019

Journal of Development Economics

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“…One area focuses on the role of major powers in shaping outcomes including loans, agendas, concessions, votes, or peacekeeping scope (Stone 2004;Kuziemko and Werker 2006;Kaja and Werker 2010;Kilby 2011;Kleine 2013;Allen and Yuen 2013;Mikulaschek 2017;McLean 2017). Another takes advantage of the unique institutional environment of the United Nations to answer broader questions, in the spirit of the second half of this paper (Gartzke 1998;Fisman and Miguel 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat

Novosad

Werker

2018

Rev Int Organ

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National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60-year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which states are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Democracy, investment in diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions-even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.

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“…Second, the paper adds to the related literature studying the politics behind different financing instruments of the EU (for general reviews, see, Alesina et al 2005;Baldwin and Wyplosz 2012;Dür et al 2020). In particular, studies find that political factors, such as voting and proposal powers of the Member States in the EU, but also other international organizations, systematically affect the allocation of the EU Budget (see, among others, Bachtler and Mendez 2007;Aksoy 2010;Aksoy 2012;Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2012;Schneider 2013;Mikulaschek 2018;Gehring and Schneider 2018). 8 Our contribution to this literature is to document the existence of home-bias at the regional level in addition to the previously found biases at the national level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

The political economy of multilateral lending to European regions

Asatryan

Havlik

2020

Rev Int Organ

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We study the political economy of allocation decisions within a major state investment bank. Our focus is the European Investment Bank (EIB)-"The Bank of the EU"-which is the largest multilateral lending (and borrowing) institution in the world. We study the behavior of about 500 national representatives at the EIB's Board of Directors-the bank's decisive body for loan approvals-and show that a representative's appointment increases the probability that the sub-national region where she works receives a loan by about 17 percentage points. This "home-bias" effect is driven by large loans financing infrastructure projects. We discuss several pieces of evidence, which are consistent with the hypothesis that this home-bias lending may be due to favoritism, however, we cannot conclusively demonstrate this case of resource misallocation.

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Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

Cited by 25 publications

References 53 publications

The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending

The political economy of International Finance Corporation lending

Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat

The political economy of multilateral lending to European regions

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