Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat

Abstract

National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60-year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which states are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Democracy, investment in diplomacy, foreign aid, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions-even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large.

Avoiding disciplinary garbage cans: a pledge for a problem-driven approach to researching international public administration

“…Moreover, scholars show how member states can exert unilateral influence on IPAs, thereby theoretically acknowledging member states in IOs as complex principals (Dijkstra, 2015;Urpelainen, 2012). These studies find that it is, in particular, the politics of staffing (Novosad & Werker, 2019;Parízek, 2017), the politics of financing (Bayram & Graham, 2016;Goetz & Patz, 2017;Graham, 2016) but also the politics of evaluation (Eckhard & Jankauskas, 2018) that allow individual members to circumvent multilateral voting.…”

The long march through the institutions: Emerging powers and the staffing of international organizations

“…This realist-inspired story is consistent with a power-oriented institutionalist perspective which understands states as competing for influence over IOs via informal mechanisms such as bureaucratic politics, lobbying and agenda setting (Stone, 2013). One important mechanism of informal influence is the placement of fellow nationals in the professional staffs of IOs (Dijkstra, 2017: 610; Kleine, 2013; Novosad and Werker, 2019). 5 Because institutions are understood as expressions of power politics, they are likely to reflect closely the distribution of power amongst states.…”

“…The UN has been central to the international system since 1945 and is supposed to embody the idea, originating in the League of Nations, of an impartial international civil service drawn from different backgrounds but committed to the internationalist cause (Ziring et al, 2005: 136). As one of the core organs, the UN Secretariat plays a critical role in administering the UN’s work (see Novosad and Werker, 2019: 55–56 for an overview).…”

“…Yet states exercise control, gain prestige and secure resources not only through formal institutional privileges but also informally via the placement of their own nationals on IOs’ professional staffs. 1 In light of the traditional predominance of the nationals of developed countries within international secretariats (Novosad and Werker, 2019; Parizek, 2017), it is not surprising that emerging powers such as China have sought to increase their representation in the staffs of various international institutions (Liu, 2018). The BRICS countries (including South Africa) annually repeat their calls to make IOs such as the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the IMF ‘more inclusive, democratic and representative, including through greater participation of emerging markets and developing countries in international decision-making’ (BRICS, 2019: 2).…”

Keeping tabs on your cooperating partners: a coalition perspective on international organizations

“…The literature on informal governance describes a myriad of possibilities to bias policy implementation by an international organization through the manipulation of its staff and its funding. For example, states may press for the recruitment of co-nationals with similar preferences (Kleine 2013b, 329–31; similarly, Novosad and Werker 2018) or they use career incentives and punishments in order to compel compatriots in the bureaucracy to bias policies in their favor (Wonka 2007, 182–3; Voeten 2008, 420; Chwieroth 2013). Major powers can threaten to withhold funds or create complicated legal obstacles to the implementation of unpopular policies (Urpelainen 2012, 708; similarly Stone 2004).…”