2012
DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2011.605627
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Islamic reformation discourses: popular sovereignty and religious secularisation in Iran

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Cited by 14 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…86 This is a phenomenon which has been popularly associated with the so-called 'Islamism-Secularism' conflict. 87 It is not far-fetched to propose that the emergence of political Islam in the closing decades of the 20th century represented a significant contribution to the subverting of the global secularization thesis popularized by Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Much of the academic literature in the new millennium is criticalor at least sceptical -of this thesis, although the secular-religious dichotomy is still the underlying assumption in the debate surrounding secularism.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…86 This is a phenomenon which has been popularly associated with the so-called 'Islamism-Secularism' conflict. 87 It is not far-fetched to propose that the emergence of political Islam in the closing decades of the 20th century represented a significant contribution to the subverting of the global secularization thesis popularized by Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Much of the academic literature in the new millennium is criticalor at least sceptical -of this thesis, although the secular-religious dichotomy is still the underlying assumption in the debate surrounding secularism.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The 1979 revolution, however, was not merely concerning economy; it was heralded, and its virtues often judged, by its normative call. It was an unprecedented attempt to fuse divine and popular sovereignties (Ghobadzadeh and Rahim ; Jahanbegloo ). Since its inception, the regime has labored to balance the ethos of “popular will,” drawing on civil society in the public sphere, with the theocratic principle of Vilayat‐e Faqih , the sanctified guardianship of the religious jurist (the supreme leader); and similarly on blending Iranian nationalism with the pan‐Islamic Umma .…”
Section: Iranian Nuclear Diversionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Disillusioned, many Iranians began to believe that the regime could not be reformed. Ghobadzadeh and Rahim (, 344) accurately observe: “[a]lthough the political crisis in Iran was triggered by widespread protests challenging the outcome of the 2009 presidential election, it rapidly transformed into protests challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic state.” The ethos of “popular will” was profoundly undermined by Khamenei's hasty endorsement of the election results and by the regime's oppressive brutality, leveraging both the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and the paramilitary Basij. “The extensive protests revealed just how deep the disconnect between state and society had become, whereas the reaction which unfolded further highlighted the ideological fissures at the top” (Ansari , 281; cf.…”
Section: Iranian Nuclear Diversionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…In other words, I demonstrate that their legacies make some functional clues available, clues with which one can deal with concrete issues in the Islamic world. As far as Iranian intellectuals are concerned, their works have been studied by some scholars (Boroujerdi 1996; Mirsepassi 2000, [1380] 2001, [1381] 2002; Jahanbakhsh 2003, 2004; Khavar 2004; Ghobadzadeh & Rahim 2012; Adib-Moghaddam 2015; Safari 2015), but their methodological contributions remained unnoticed. Most of these critical studies are concerned with the relationship between Islam and secular democracy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%