Nuclear Diversion Theory and Legitimacy Crisis: The Case of Iran

Abstract

Can an insecure regime use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy? This article argues that facing a domestic legitimacy crisis, a regime might opt to "rally round the nuclear flag" to survive. Theoretically, I argue that, compared with conventional diversion, nuclear diversion is less susceptible to structural restraints, has a unique symbolic value that could aid in coping with an acute legitimacy crisis, and spans a host of diversionary strategies as it ascends the escalation ladder, both before and after acquiring the bomb. The theory is examined empirically via Iranian nuclear policy. I argue that facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the Iranian regime, throughout Ahmadinejad's tenure, has been increasingly drawing on nuclear diversion to boost public support and that, if the legitimacy crisis lingers, the regime may opt to further employ diversionary nuclear strategies, most of which require a viable "nuclear latency," rather than actual military nuclear capability.What are the causes and reasons for "going nuclear"? Among the myriad explanations, this article focuses on one: domestic legitimacy crisis. I explore this rarely analyzed motivation to go nuclear, suggesting that an insecure regime can use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy. Nuclear diversion theory complements prevalent arguments regarding the drivers of nuclear proliferation, which accentuate economic incentives, deterrence and compellence, prestige and status, identity politics, parochial interests, and international norms (Brown et al.

The malpractice of “rationality” in international relations

“…My purpose is not to ascertain the real motivations behind, and possible implications of, Iranian nuclear policy (Abulof, 2013(Abulof, , 2014, nor do I offer comparisons or syntheses of rational choice accounts with other FPA models, such as groupthink, cognitive analogies, and government politics (Yetiv, 2011). I also do not purport to exhaust all extant literature on Iranian nuclear policy, much of which does not involve rationality-based accounts.…”

“…Can a nuclear Iran be deterred? I do not attempt to resolve these questions either affirmatively or negatively, nor do I purport to reveal Iran's nuclear motivations and their implications (on this see Abulof, 2013Abulof, , 2014. Instead, by examinng rationality-based accounts of Iranian nuclear policy, I opt to show how rationality has been used, and misused, to answer these important questions.…”