Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?

Achinstein, Peter

doi:10.2307/3655684

Cited by 90 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…2. Interestingly, Achinstein (2002) seems to be unaware of Fine's criticism of the sort of eliminative causal reasoning that he defends in Perrin's work. Specifically, Fine (1991), criticises Miller's (1987) account of Brownian motion because it makes a realist causal eliminative inference to molecules in a way Fine deems illegitimate.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 87%

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

McArthur

2006

Found Sci

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In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent "softer" accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as "the anti-philosophical stance". I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 87%

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

McArthur

2006

Found Sci

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“…A good example of this sort of strategy is Achinstein's (2002) properties of unobservable bodies (e.g. molecules), but not about inferences from properties of observed bodies to properties of observable but unobserved bodies, given that we can vary the features in virtue of which bodies are observable (e.g.…”

Section: An Alternative Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Doing Away with the No Miracles Argument

Fitzpatrick

2013

EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science

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The recent debate surrounding scientific realism has largely focused on the "no miracles" argument (NMA). Indeed, it seems that most contemporary realists and anti-realists have tied the case for realism to the adequacy of this argument. I argue that it is mistake for realists to let the debate be framed in this way.Realists would be well advised to abandon the NMA altogether and pursue an alternative strategy, which I call the "local strategy".

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“…A good example of this sort of strategy is Achinstein's (2002) discussion of Jean Perrin's early twentieth century arguments for the atomic theory, which posits that chemical substances are composed of unobservable atoms and molecules, and that Avogadro's number, N (the number of molecules in a sample of a substance whose weight in grams is equal to the molecular weight of the substance), is a constant approximately equal to 6 10 23 . Achinstein (following an earlier suggestion from Wesley Salmon) claims that Perrin's experiments on Brownian motion provide a compelling case for realism about the atomic theory -indeed, one that convinced many of Perrin's anti-realist contemporaries.…”

Section: An Alternative Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science

Karakostas¹,

Dieks²

2013

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Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?

Cited by 90 publications

References 0 publications

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

Doing Away with the No Miracles Argument

EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science

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