“…Unlike Hungary and Turkey, Polish local governments proved resilient, arguably due to antecedent (Slater and Simmons 2010 ) 7 more robust public support for local autonomy—72% approval in 2016 (Freedom House 2017 ; Rajca 2020 ), guarantees in the constitution including access to judicial remedy for breaches of autonomy, 8 power to set levels of local taxes, and strict regulation of legal supervision through the law (Monitoring Committee 2019 , paras 91–96, Sześciło, 2019 ), as well as developed case-law compared to weak legal standards, including weak access to courts of local governments in Turkey 9 (Monitoring Committee 2022 , paras 31, 51, 248) and Hungary (Hajnal et al 2021 , Monitoring Committee 2021 , paras 4, 253–254). 10 The most important legislative change adopted in June 2017 increasing powers of a central agency tasked with financial supervision over self-government spending in Poland was vetoed by President himself with arguments referring to constitutional guarantees of self-government (Sześciło, 2019 ). The change if implemented would have increased the powers of the central government in determining the composition of the financial supervision body (competitive procedure was substituted with the discretion of Prime Minister in appointments), also it would have extended the scope of review beyond legality to include cost-effectiveness and reliability review at least when it came to loans, credits and municipal bonds.…”