Is there a Plural Object?

Yi, Byeong-uk

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.003.0009

Cited by 14 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…17 The simplest argument to this effect goes as follows. Sider (2007Sider ( , 2014, and Yi (1999Yi ( , 2014. Here I am following in particular Sider (2014).…”

Section: How To Avoid the Bad Consequences Of Collapsementioning

confidence: 99%

Composition, identity and plural ontology

Loss¹

2020

Synthese

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According to 'Strong Composition as Identity' (SCAI), if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAItheorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some 'weak' plural comprehension principle and, thus, 'exclude' some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most 'joint-carving' plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, 'unrestricted' plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over 'super-pluralities' of entities.

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“…17 The simplest argument to this effect goes as follows. Sider (2007Sider ( , 2014, and Yi (1999Yi ( , 2014. Here I am following in particular Sider (2014).…”

Section: How To Avoid the Bad Consequences Of Collapsementioning

confidence: 99%

Composition, identity and plural ontology

Loss¹

2020

Synthese

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“…Conceptualizations as a deck of cards and as a frog are therefore incompatible. 7 The concept-based view has been criticized by Koslicki (1997) and Yi (2014) on the grounds that our ordinary concepts are not suitable for the view to work in full generality. 8 Frege discusses this in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884: §46).…”

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confidence: 99%

On relativist approaches to many-one identity

Lipman

2018

Synthese

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Composition as identity is the view that a whole is identical to its parts taken collectively. Such a view raises the question of how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things. A primitivist view holds that there is no explanation to be had and that we simply need to accept that being one thing and being many things are compatible. One might think that we can do better by resorting to relativization. A relativist view may seem to explain how the same portion of reality can be both one thing and many things on the basis of the assumption that the portion of reality is these ways relative to different 'concepts' or 'counts'. This paper discusses whether relativization truly leads to a satisfactory explanation of how something can be both one thing and many things. The conclusion will be that, when we consider the current accounts of the involved parameters, these relativizations make no explanatory progress.

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“…There is no such thing as a plural object: many things are not one thing, composition is not identity, and composition, even when modally invariant, is not ontologically innocent, on pain of contradiction (cf. Priest, 2014, p. 51;Yi, 1999aYi, , 2014. Appealing to some mechanism of plural reference represents no way out from this contradiction, because "[t]he machinery does not allow us to refer to objects that are plural, but to a plurality of objects.…”

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“…II). Under the influence of Yi (1999aYi ( , 1999bYi ( , 2014, I have partially changed my previous stance on these matters (cf. Briceño, 2016).…”

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Arguing about the world’s cardinality: Priority, existence, and metaphysical necessity

Briceño

2018

Filosofia Unisinos

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Metaphysicians still discuss about the number of things. According to monists, there is one thing, either fundamental (Priority Monism) or exclusionary (Existence Monism). According to pluralists, there are many things, either fundamental (Priority Pluralism) or exclusionary (Existence Pluralism). The claims of cardinality of these views are, presumably, metaphysical claims, which means, presumably, that they are necessarily true, if true at all. In this paper, I unravel a common pattern of some of the main arguments used by the parties involved and challenge their assumptions. By doing this, I intend to show that those arguments are all equally impotent to settle the question about the number of things because their conclusions are not necessary truths as they are meant to be. These views, at the very most, can be presented and defended as consistent ways of saying how many things, apparently, might be. RESUMOMetafísicos ainda discutem sobre o número das coisas. De acordo com os monistas, há uma coisa, seja fundamental (Monismo Prioritário) ou excludente (Monismo de Existência). De acordo com os pluralistas, há muitas coisas, seja fundamental (Pluralismo Prioritário) ou excludente (Pluralismo de Existência). As alegações de cardinalidade dessas visões são, presumivelmente, afirmações metafísicas, o que significa, presumivelmente, que el as são necessariamente verdadeiras, se são verdadeiras. Neste artigo, desvelo um padrão comum de alguns dos principais argumentos usados pelas partes envolvidas e questiono suas suposições. Ao fazer isso, pretendo mostrar que esses argumentos são igualmente impotentes para resolver a questão sobre o número das coisas, porque suas conclusões não são verdades necessárias como pretendem ser. Essas visões, no máximo, podem ser apresentadas e defendidas como formas consistentes de dizer quantas coisas, aparentemente, podem ser.Palavras-chave: cardinalidade, fundamentalidade, existência, monismo, pluralismo, niilismo. 1 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper was written as part of my research project Fondecyt-Iniciación 11160724 (Conicyt, Chile).

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Is there a Plural Object?

Cited by 14 publications

References 11 publications

Composition, identity and plural ontology

Composition, identity and plural ontology

On relativist approaches to many-one identity

Arguing about the world’s cardinality: Priority, existence, and metaphysical necessity

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