Composition, identity and plural ontology

Loss, Roberto

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02628-w

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Following Sider (2011), Loss (2020) claims that some quantifiers are more 'metaphysically perspicuous' than others: they do a better job at 'carving nature at the joints'. Moreover, he suggests, the most joint-carving quantifiers (singular and plural) range only over atoms.…”

Section: Lossmentioning

confidence: 99%

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Payton

2021

Synthese

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According to 'composition as identity' (CAI), a composite object is identical to all its parts taken together. Thus, a plurality of composite objects is identical to the plurality of those objects' parts. This has the consequence that, e.g., the bricks which compose a brick wall are identical to the atoms which compose those bricks, and hence that the plurality of bricks must include each of those atoms. This consequence of CAI is in direct conflict with the standard analysis of plural definite descriptions (and hence with the standard plural comprehension schema which uses it). According to that analysis, the denotation of 'the bricks' can include only bricks. It seems, then, that if CAI is true, 'the bricks' doesn't denote anything; more generally, if CAI is true, there are fewer pluralities than we ordinarily think. I respond to this argument by developing an alternative analysis of plural descriptions (and an alternative comprehension schema) which allows the denotation of 'the bricks' to include non-bricks. Thus, we can accept CAI, while still believing in all the pluralities we could want. As a bonus, my approach to plural descriptions and plural comprehension blocks recent arguments to the effect that CAI entails compositional nihilism.

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Section: Lossmentioning

confidence: 99%

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Payton

2021

Synthese

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“…In the first form (discussed by Sider 2014), U-CAI is left intact and it is the very comprehension principle for pluralities that is 'restricted', in the sense that is formulated so as to generate 'fewer pluralities than one normally expects' (Sider 2014: 213). In some previous work I have endorsed this strategy (Loss , 2020. In particular, I have argued ) that CAI-theorists should endorse an 'atomic' comprehension principle which, conjoined with U-CAI, entails that there are only pluralities of mereological atoms (so that the plural quantifier quantifies only over pluralities of mereological atoms).…”

Section: Cai Innocence and Mereological Nihilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sider's ( 2014) proposal (made on behalf of CAI-theorists) can be translated as a restricted form of CAI as follows: R-CAI-S ∀ x ∀ yy ((xFyy ∧ ∀z (z ≺ yy ↔ z ≤ x)) → x = yy) 10 As I have argued (Loss 2020), these two forms of restriction may be compatible, provided one distinguishes between more and less joint-carving plural quantifiers. For simplicity's sake in what follows I will ignore this possibility and focus only on the strategy of simply restricting CAI.…”

Section: Cai Innocence and Mereological Nihilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I will use ‘

(][, a_{1}, a_{2}, \dots, a_{n})

’ as short for the plural definite description ‘the plurality of entities such that something is one of them if and only if it is identical to either

a_{1}, a_{2},

…, or

a_{n}

’ (see Loss 2020: 13). The following plural comprehension principle is usually taken to be an axiom of plural logic (Linnebo 2017: §1.2):

COMP

\exists x ϕ_{x} \to \exists y y \forall x (x ≺ y y \leftrightarrow ϕ_{x})

…”

Section: Stage‐settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, I have argued (Loss 2019) that CAI‐theorists should endorse an ‘atomic’ comprehension principle which, conjoined with U‐CAI, entails that there are only pluralities of mereological atoms (so that the plural quantifier quantifies only over pluralities of mereological atoms). However, weakening COMP in such a radical way may appear to be a rather desperate manoeuvre, given that it seems to make plural logic almost useless (Loss 2020: 6). For this reason, many may prefer the second restriction strategy, which consists in simply reformulating CAI as applying only to a certain kind of parts of a composite object.…”

Section: Cai Innocence and Mereological Nihilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology

Loss

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to the thesis known as ‘Composition as Identity’ (‘CAI’), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After having shown that said argument is independent from the problems surrounding the infamous ‘Collapse Principle’, I will conclude that CAI‐theorists should endorse a suitably ‘restricted’ version of CAI. In the final part of the paper I will then argue that the best restricted version of CAI is the theory according to which every composite entity is identical to the plurality of its atomic parts.

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Parts and Wholes

Wallace

2023

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The Odd Universe Argument aims to show that from four intuitive assumptions about parts and wholes, we can conclude a priori that there is an odd number of things in the universe. This Element investigates how this is so and where things might have gone awry. Section 1 gives an overview of general methodology, basic mereology, and plural logic. Section 2 explores questions about the nature of composition and decomposition. Does composition always occur? Never? Sometimes? Is the universe, at rock bottom, just many partless bits (simples)? Or do the parts have parts all the way down (gunk)? Section 3 looks at arguments for and against the thesis that composition is identity, with a healthy bias in its favor. In the wake of this discussion, we reconsider our methods of counting. We conclude with a return to the odd universe argument and suggestions on how best to resist it.

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Composition, identity and plural ontology

Cited by 3 publications

References 39 publications

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Composition as identity, now with all the pluralities you could want

Composition as Identity and the Innocence of Mereology

Parts and Wholes

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